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the conclusion of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
in 1993 and for Korea since the initiation of the FTA drive in 2003.  
Both governments have promoted the U.S.-Korea FTA as the trade 
agreement that will enhance trade between the two countries and 
promote economic prosperity.  The article critically reviews the 
inherent features of the U.S.-Korea FTA and examines whether the 
FTA is expected to promote the promised economic prosperity for 
both countries.  The article also discusses prospects and impacts of 
the FTA on creating even larger free trade agreements between East 
Asia and North America and between East Asia and Europe. 
 
 
I.	   INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... 113	  
II.	   HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. -KOREA FTA ......... 117	  
A. Economic Background.............................................................117 
B. Political Background ...............................................................119 
C. FTA Negotiations.....................................................................120 
III.	   RECENT TRENDS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE U.S.-
KOREA FTA ........................................................................ 121	  
A. General Development ..............................................................121 
B. Social Impacts of FTA .............................................................123 
C. Economic Impacts....................................................................126 
IV.	   KEY ISSUES IN THE U.S.-KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT... 132	  
A. Overall Observations...............................................................132 
B. Agriculture and Textiles ..........................................................134 
C. Access to Services Market .......................................................137 
D. Intellectual Property Rights.....................................................139 
E. Investment Protection ..............................................................142 
F. Regulatory Issues.....................................................................144 
G. Restrictions on Trade Remedy Measures ................................148 
V.	   IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS OF THE U.S. -KOREA FTA 149	  
A. Subsequent Legislation in Korea after Conclusion of the US -
Korea FTA ...............................................................................149 
B. Additional Negotiation of the FTA between the United States and 
Korea .......................................................................................151 
C. Prospects for Ratification by the U.S. and Korean 
 Legislatures.............................................................................152 
VI.	   FUTURE IMPACTS OF THE U.S. -KOREA FTA.......................... 153	  
A. Economic Integration between the United States and Korea..153 
B. Stimulus for More FTAs and East Asia Free Trade Area .......158 
C. Path to Trans-Pacific Free Trade Area...................................159 
D. Encouragement for East Asia - Europe Free Trade Area .......161 
 
 
2011]  THE UNITED STATES – KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT        113            
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The historic U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA),1 which is 
the largest FTA since the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the first FTA between major trading nations in North 
America and Asia, was agreed upon on April 2, 2007 after 14 months of 
negotiations, and signed on June 30, 2007.2  Nonetheless, legislatures of the 
two countries have not been able to ratify the FTA after well over three 
years, although they might be a bit closer to ratification due to the 
renegotiation of the FTA on December 5, 2010.3  Considering the fact that 
the governments of the two countries were able to sign the controversial 
FTA after negotiations that continued for only 14 months, this failure to 
ratify the agreement for such a long time is an ironic aftermath.  
The U.S.-Korea FTA faced significant political opposition in the 
two countries: on December 18, 2008, Korean media reported that violence 
erupted in the National Assembly of Korea (i.e., the Korean legislature) 
during a deliberation of the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee at which the 
ruling party attempted to table a motion to pass the U.S.-Korea FTA, a 
prerequisite procedure for the vote of ratification at the plenary session 
under the Korean constitution.  Meanwhile, the opposition party members 
of the Sub-Committee were blocked from entering the meeting room.4  
 
1 Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, 
U.S.-S. Kor., June 30, 2007, modified, Dec. 5, 2010 [hereinafter KORUS FTA], available at 
 http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text. A full text 
version is available from the Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
[hereinafter MOFAT], at http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/fta_korea/usa/eng/2E_all.pdf. For 
additional details regarding the U.S.-Korea FTA, see Signed, Negotiated and Concluded 
FTAs, http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/kor_usa.asp?country_idx=19 (last visited Oct. 28, 
2010) (in Korean). 
2 For the chronology of the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations and signing provided by MOFAT, 
see Korea — U.S. FTA, at http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/fta/Concluded/US/ 
index.jsp (last visited Oct. 28, 2010) [hereinafter MOFAT, Chronology]. Particularly, the 
final completion of the negotiations and the subsequent signing of the agreement between 
the trade ministers of the two countries are detailed in MOFAT’s press releases. Press 
Release, MOFAT, Han-Mi FTA Choijong Hyupjungmoon Gonggae [Final Text of the 
Korea-U.S. FTA Made Publicly Available] (No. 07-428, July 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/press/pressinformation/index.jsp (enter “FTA” in search box and 
look for press release item no. 259, posted on July 2, 2007); Press Release, MOFAT, Han-
Mi Jayu Muyuk Hyupjung (FTA) Hyupsang Tagyul [Korea-U.S FTA Negotiations 
Completed] (No. 07-191, Apr. 2, 2007), available at http://www.mofat.go.kr/press/ 
pressinformation/index.jsp (enter “FTA” in search box and look for press release item no. 
239, posted on April 4, 2007) (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
3  U.S., Korea Sign Sweeping Free-Trade Agreement, TAIPEI TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/front/archives/2010/12/05/02003490144.  
4 For an account of the resistance of opposition Democratic Party members to tabling the 
agreement and their attempt to force an entry into the National Assembly after being barred 
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Representatives of NGOs, together with academics and former high-level 
government officials in Korea all expressed concerns about the unfairness 
of the terms of the FTA and possible adverse long-term effects on Korea’s 
economy and society, some of which are elaborated upon in this article. 
The prospect did not appear very promising in the United States, 
either.  While the Republican administration welcomed the negotiated FTA 
at the time of its completion, the then Democratic majority leaders in 
Congress raised objections to its ratification.5  Hillary Clinton, the U.S. 
Secretary of State of the current administration, indicated that the re-
negotiation of some of the terms of the U.S.-Korea FTA would be 
necessary before Congress could ratify it.6  Even though the United States 
 
from attendance by Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Park Jin, a member of the 
incumbent Grand National Party, see Hyun-Kyung Kang, Assembly in FTA Conflict, KOR. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/12/116_36329. 
html. 
5 For instance, Sander Levin from the State of Michigan, chair of the House Subcommittee 
on Trade, stated that the agreement failed to “assure elimination of the barriers against US 
automotive products and the opening of Korea's iron curtain around their market” and 
promised to oppose the deal unless changes were made to rectify this during the 90-day 
Congressional review period. US and Korea Conclude Free Trade Agreement, BRIDGES 
WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Apr. 4, 2007, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/7581.  
Other prominent Democratic Senators—including then-campaigning presidential candidates 
Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama—were also known to oppose the U.S.-Korea FTA. See 
Hilori ‘Han-Mi FTA Bijun Bandae’ [Hillary ‘Opposes Ratification of Korea-U.S. FTA’], 
DONG-A NEWS, June 11, 2007, http://www.donga.com/fbin/output?n=200706110083 
(reporting presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s remarks at a meeting with the AFL-CIO 
that disparaged the Korea-U.S. FTA on grounds that it did not favor US auto exports and 
was disadvantageous to the US’s current trade deficit, and predicted that other democratic 
candidates would be motivated to take similar positions so as to secure labor union support); 
see also reports of one commentator, noting that the U.S. Congress had not ratified a bill to 
extend normal trade relations with Vietnam, and that it was expected future trade bills 
would face greater difficulty in passing through the Democratic Congress.  Steven 
Weisman, Trade Bills Now Face Tough Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, at C1 
[hereinafter Weisman, Trade Bills]. 
6 See Michael Ha, Clinton Indicates Renegotiation of KORUS FTA, KOR. TIMES, Jan. 14, 
2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/01/116_37853.html (quoting 
Hillary Clinton during the Democratic administration’s transition period as arguing that the 
“[FTA] provisions need[] to be renegotiated to ensure fair bilateral trade practices in the 
future . . . . [and adding] that Obama hasn’t changed his position on the FTA [negotiated and 
signed by the outgoing Bush administration] and continues to oppose the deal in its current 
form.”).  Two months after the completion of the FTA negotiations in April 2007, and at the 
request of the United States, the two countries conducted additional negotiations on labor 
and environmental issues, signing a final text on June 30, 2007.  WILLIAM H. COOPER ET. AL., 
U.S. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE PROPOSED U.S.-SOUTH KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
(KORUS FTA): PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 39 (2010) (describing in note 148 how the 
two sides held further negotiations and included new language in the final text signed on 
June 30, 2007, incorporating “internationally-accepted” labor rights and certain 
environmental principles), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
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made important achievements in the negotiations, fulfilling key American 
interests in the areas of agriculture, pharmaceuticals, intellectual property 
rights (IPRs), and services, some leaders in Congress doubted as to whether 
American automobiles would gain long-awaited market access in Korea as 
a result of the FTA and expressed concern that the FTA would further 
increase Korean exports to America at the expense of U.S. domestic 
automobile producers.7  A report circulated by the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Finance indicated that four major issues would have to be addressed 
before the U.S.-Korea FTA could be consented to, namely:  the large 
imbalance in the automobile trade between the United States and Korea; 
problems involving U.S. beef exports to Korea; the opening up of the 
Korean rice market; and the treatment of Korea’s outer production zone in 
North Korea, called the “Kaesong Industrial Complex.”8 
 
127268.pdf [hereinafter COOPER, PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS].  For a brief outline of the 
“new trade policy” principles articulated by the U.S. Congress, see infra note 54.  After the 
June 2007 signing date, the Korean government established its opposition to any proposed 
re-negotiation of certain provisions, arguing that such re-negotiation would undermine the 
balance of concessions between the two countries achieved through the original 
negotiations, although it had implied a possibility of “additional negotiations” that would 
address remaining concerns of the parties without involving any change of terms in the 
previously-agreed FTA provisions.  In early November 2010, the two sides conducted 
“additional negotiations” in Seoul mostly with respect to the automobile sector, though it 
initially appeared as though they would remain mired in contention.  Obama to return home 
empty-handed: U.S., South Korea Fail to Reach Agreement on Free-Trade Deal, 
NYDAILYNEWS.COM, Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2010/ 
11/11/2010-11-11_us_south_korea_fail_to_reach_agreement_on_freetrade_deal.html; see 
also He-Suk Choi, Korea, U.S., to Meet to Settle FTA Disputes, KOR. HERALD, Nov. 5, 2010, 
http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20101105000555 (explaining 
how the two nations were conducting additional meetings to iron out areas of disagreement 
in the run-up to G20 Seoul Summit); President Obama and President Lee, Joint Press 
Conference on G-20 (Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2010/11/11/president-conference-with-president-obama-and-president-lee-republic-
kor (quoting President Lee as announcing  to the press that he had agreed with President 
Obama on the need for further talks between the Trade Minister and U.S. Trade 
Representative, and President Obama emphasizing the priority the U.S. placed on removing 
barriers, while articulating the ways in which the FTA would “create jobs and prosperity in 
both our countries” and constitute a  “win-win for both countries.”).  However, on 
December 5, 2010 the two sides finally reached a final agreement and concluded 
renegotiation of the FTA.  See U.S., Korea Sign Sweeping Free-Trade Agreement, supra 
note 3. 
7 Congressional leaders’ attitudes towards such deals were little changed from months 
earlier, when the Vietnam deal provoked stormy opposition.  Weisman, Trade Bills, supra 
note 5, at C1, C5. 
8 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 111TH CONG., TRADE ISSUES IN THE 111TH CONGRESS (2009).  
See also U.S. Senate Points Out 4 Potential Points of Discussion Regarding FTA, 
ARIRANG.CO.KR, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq= 
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Despite the continuing controversies in Korea,9 and the air of 
discomfort and hesitation surrounding the ratification of the U.S.-Korea 
FTA by the U.S. Congress, the legislatures of both countries are expected 
to eventually ratify the FTA because of the closely interconnected political 
and economic interests of the two countries.10  The two countries may 
consider that if the proposed U.S.-Korea FTA fails to go into effect, the 
repercussions will be felt not only in the economic sector, but also in the 
political and diplomatic sectors.11  Such interconnectedness has developed 
over several decades: the United States and Korea have maintained a strong 
military alliance and close economic relations for over six decades.  In 
2008, trade between the United States and Korea amounted to US$84.74 
billion, making the United States Korea’s third-largest trading partner and 
Korea the United States’ seventh-largest trading partner.12   This FTA 
 
86330&code=Ne4 (describing the Senate Finance Committee’s position on the four major 
changes that the FTA would have to include, while forecasting “a rough road ahead for the 
already signed and sealed free trade agreement . . . .”). 
9 See Jaemin Lee, Korea-U.S. Economic Relationship With or Without an FTA: KORUS 
FTA as a Better Alternative to Manage the Bilateral Economic Relationship, 2009 JOINT 
U.S.-KOREA ACADEMIC STUDIES 159 [hereinafter LEE, BETTER ALTERNATIVE], available at 
 http://www.keia.org/Publications/JointAcademicStudies/2009/Jaemin.pdf (“Korea has 
concluded roughly about 2,500 treaties since its inception in 1948, but probably none of 
them have caused such a heated controversy and debate as we are observing with respect to 
[the Korea-U.S. FTA].”). There are currently 227 treaties in force between the two countries, 
none of which has invited a similar level of ongoing national controversy. For a summary 
from MOFAT of treaties the Republic of Korea has signed to date, see Daehan Mingug 
Yangja Joyag Jeongbo: Balhyo Joyag [Republic of Korea Bilateral Treaty Information: 
Treaties in Force], http://www.mofat.go.kr/state/treatylaw/treatyinformation/ 
index.jsp (listing bilateral treaties to which Korea is a signatory in reverse chronological 
order). 
10 In a recent interview, President Barack Obama pledged to push for ratification of the 
U.S.-Korea FTA.  Mike Dorning & Julianna Goldman, Obama Says He’s ‘Fierce’ Free-
Market Advocate, Rejects Critics, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 11, 2010, available at 
 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aDLk0lPYaSa0 (“[President 
Obama] said he would press for passage this year of free-trade agreements with South 
Korea, Panama and Columbia, though he cautioned that ‘different glitches’ must first be 
negotiated with each country.”).  Once ratified, the agreement goes into effect 60 days after 
the exchange of instruments notifying the other side of completion of respective domestic 
procedures.  See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 24.5, available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file12_12723.pdf. (“This 
Agreement shall enter into force 60 days after the date the Parties exchange written 
notifications certifying that they have completed their respective applicable legal 
requirements and procedures or on such other date as the Parties may agree.”). 
11 See LEE, BETTER ALTERNATIVE, supra note 9, at 166 (“If the proposed KORUS FTA fails 
to go into effect, the impact will not be simply confined to the obvious economic loss.  
Needless to say, political and diplomatic repercussions will certainly follow. . . .”). 
12 See generally MOFAT, KOREA-U.S. TRADE SUMMARY (Dec. 2009), 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/bilateral/issues/index2.jsp?TabMenu=TabMenu2 
(listing export, import, trade volume and trade balance values from 2006 to September 
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between the two countries stands to be the most significant trade agreement 
for the United States since NAFTA in terms of its economic and trade 
impact.13  Due to the broad political and economic effects it will have on 
both countries, as well as on the trade and economy in Asia and beyond, 
the proposed U.S.-Korea FTA has become a subject of much interest and 
considerable debate.  This article provides a discussion of the background 
of the U.S.-Korea FTA, the key issues involved, and its broader impact on 
the trade relations in the Asian-Pacific region and beyond.  
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. -KOREA FTA 
A. Economic Background  
The FTA talks between the United States and Korea began in 
November 2004 when the two countries agreed, at a Trade Ministers’ 
meeting held in Chile, to hold preliminary working-level talks to examine 
the feasibility of an FTA between the two countries.14  The driving forces 
behind the U.S.-Korea FTA can be analyzed from many different angles.  
First, from the U.S. economic perspective, Korea provides a major export 
market, and the United States wants to increase access to products and 
services markets in which it has a competitive advantage, such as in 
agricultural and pharmaceutical goods, as well as the financial services 
market.  Because Korea, in Washington’s view, has a low level of openness 
in these markets, the United States can expect the FTA to yield large 
increases in exports.15  For this reason, the Office of the United States 
 
2010).  However, it should be noted that if the “Chinese Diversion” effect—encompassing 
Korean products made in China but destined for the U.S. market, which are not accounted 
for in the Korean statistics—is duly accounted for, the United States may still be the largest 
trading partner of Korea.  See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN 
GOODS AND SERVICES, EXHIBIT 14: EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND BALANCE OF GOODS BY 
SELECTED COUNTRIES AND GEOGRAPHIC AREAS (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www. 
census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/2008pr/12/exh14.txt (reflecting cumulative 2008 
U.S. imports from China and Korea, amounting to US$337.79 billion worth of imports from 
China, compared to US$48.08 billion worth of imports from Korea in the same period). 
13  See U.S. Senate Points Out 4 Potential Points of Discussion Regarding FTA, 
ARIRANG.CO.KR supra note 8. 
14 MOFAT, Chronology, supra note 2. 
15 According to the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Report to Congress, Korea’s 
exports to the United States are expected to increase by 21% under the U.S.-Korea FTA, 
whereas Korea’s imports of U.S. agricultural products will increase by more than 200% in 
four years.  U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N (“USITC”), USITC PUB. 3452, U.S.-KOREA FTA: 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ESTABLISHING A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (“FTA”) BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (Inv. No. 332-425, 2001) [hereinafter USITC, 
Impact], available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/pubs/332/pub3452.pdf.  U.S. 
exports to Korea of manufactured products including movie films will increase by more 
than 54%, resulting in significant market expansion for major U.S. exports.  Id. at 5-1. 
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Trade Representative (USTR) has emphasized the economic importance of 
the FTA with Korea, in contrast to other post-NAFTA U.S. FTAs, which 
had been more politically motivated.16  In addition, the United States can 
seek to benefit U.S. businesses by adopting a comprehensive FTA that 
requires Korean laws and practices to conform to U.S. standards in areas 
where U.S. trade interests are affected.17  Furthermore, the successful 
conclusion of the U.S.-Korea FTA may also prompt Japan, which provides 
an even larger market for U.S. exports, to consider its own FTA with the 
United States more seriously in order to avoid being excluded from the U.S. 
driven free trade area in Asia.18  
In turn, the Korean government expects the FTA with the United 
States to provide its “middle-aged” economy with new growth momentum 
by expanding trade with the United States and improving its less productive 
service industries.19  The FTA is also expected to induce competition in 
their respective markets between Korean service industries and their 
competitive U.S. counterparts operating on a global scale.  Proponents of 
 
16 In light of the economic importance of the FTA, the former head of the USTR Rob 
Portman stated that the U.S.-Korea FTA “is the most commercially significant free trade 
negotiation [since NAFTA].”  Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep. (USTR), United 
States, Korea Announce Intention to Negotiate Free Trade Agreement (Feb. 2, 2006) 
[hereinafter Portman Press Release], http://ustraderep.gov/Document_Library/Press_ 
Releases/2006/February/United_States,_South_Korea_Announce_Intention_to_Negotiate_F
ree_Trade_Agreement.html. 
17 Further discussion on this point, as well as a treatment of the characteristics and problems 
of a comprehensive FTA, are provided in the next section. 
18 The possibility of an FTA between the United States and Japan has long been discussed, 
but Japan’s unwillingness to open its agricultural market has always been an obstacle to the 
promotion of an FTA between the two countries.  In an annual U.S.–Japan business meeting 
held in Tokyo, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Thomas Schieffer, said that agriculture must 
be included in any talks if the United States and Japan are to discuss a free trade agreement, 
and that Washington would not be prepared to talk about one so long as Japan treats its 
agriculture sector “in a different way.”  See Ambassador Thomas Schieffer, Address Before 
U.S.–Japan Business Council at the Imperial Hotel (Nov. 13, 2006) (“The second tenet that 
is important to remember is that agriculture has to be a part of any negotiation, whether you 
call that a free trade agreement or an economic partnership agreement. . . .  Comprehensive 
in the American context means agriculture has to be included.”), available at 
http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20061113-74.html;  see also EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY ET 
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33436, JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, at 14 
(2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf [hereinafter CHANLETT-
AVERY, ISSUES]. 
19 The Korean economy had been one of the most rapidly growing economies since the 
1960s until the 1997 financial crisis.  It recovered from the crisis, but its economic 
performance became sluggish, showing only 0.7 percent real growth in gross national 
income in 2005, with some improvement of 2.6 and 3.9 percent in 2006 and 2007, 
respectively.  See generally BANK OF KOR., ECONOMIC STATISTICS SYSTEM (ECOS), 
http://ecos.bok.or.kr/jsp/use/economyinfo_e/EconomyInfoCtl.jsp?actionType=&searchGubu
n=4&lm=5&nowNo=1. 
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the U.S.-Korea FTA argue that by inducing this competition, the agreement 
will enhance the quality and competitiveness of Korean service industries, 
thereby simultaneously improving consumer welfare and creating more 
service-related jobs.20  This supposedly positive effect of the U.S.-Korea 
FTA on the Korean economy has been subjected to intense debate.  The 
following section provides a discussion on this point. 
B. Political Background  
Although the economic aspects of the U.S.-Korea FTA have been 
emphasized by the governments of both countries, there is also a subtle, but 
significant political dimension to the agreement.  China, Korea’s largest 
export market, 21  had approached Korea with an interest in beginning 
government-level talks for a free trade agreement,22 which would further 
strengthen the rapidly growing economic ties between China and Korea.  
Amid the growing Sino-American tension,23 the U.S.-Korea FTA is in line 
with the strategic needs of the United States to hold China in check and to 
strengthen its political and economic alliance with the other East Asian 
countries.24  From the Korean government’s point of view, establishing 
closer economic relations with the United States through an FTA will also 
help solidify Korea’s security cooperation relationship with its most 
 
20 Hyun-Chong Kim, Significance of the Korea-U.S. FTA from Korea’s Perspective (Mar. 8, 
2006), available at http://www.fta.go.kr/user/intro/Media_view.asp?idx=953&currentPage= 
20&currentBlock=2&search=title&keyword=. 
21 See supra note 12. 
22 Soh-Jung Yoo, China Expresses Interest in FTA with Korea, KOR. HERALD, Aug. 4, 2005, 
 available at http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=108&oid= 
044&aid=0000052410 [hereinafter Yoo, China].  During a meeting with Korean Prime 
Minister Lee Hae-Chan in Beijing, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao expressed strong hopes for 
the early launch of FTA negotiations with Korea; see also Jin-Woo Lee, ‘Tonghwa Suwap 
Gomapji? FTA Haja.’ Joong-Il Jungsang Ittara Yogu [‘Aren’t You Thankful for the 
Monetary Swap? Let’s Sign an FTA.’ China and Japan Are Calling for FTAs], E-DAILY, 
Dec. 13, 2008, http://www.edaily.co.kr/news/NewsRead.edy?SCD=DA31&newsid= 
01207046586638192&DCD=A01502&OutLnkChk=Y (reporting announcements by 
Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, during the December 
2008 Korea-Japan and Korea-China summit meetings, declaring their interest in initiating  
FTA negotiations with Korea) [hereinafter Lee, China and Japan]. 
23 See Jaemin Lee, Torn between the Two Trade Giants: U.S.-China Trade Disputes and 
Korea, 5 KEI ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES 5 (June 2010), available at 
http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2010/APS-JaeminLee.pdf 
(discussing Sino-American tensions and their effects on Korea). 
24 It has been reported that the United States was suspected of exerting influence over 
Korea’s decision to pursue an FTA with the U.S. before China.  See Yong-Ma Lee, FTA, 
Joonggug Daeshin Migug [FTA: United States instead of China], MBC NEWS, Aug. 10, 
2006, available at http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=115& 
oid=214&aid=0000013951. 
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important ally.25  In the years preceding the FTA negotiations, some key 
security issues, including policies on North Korea, were the subject of 
disagreement between Washington and Seoul.  This discord raised 
significant concerns and it was hoped that the new FTA with the United 
States would help patch up the differences and mollify anxiety over the 
perceived gaps in U.S.-Korea relations.26 
C.  FTA Negotiations  
Once the negotiations were initiated, both governments strived for 
a speedy conclusion of the negotiations.  At the commencement declaration, 
the then head of the USTR, Rob Portman, optimistically stated that the 
negotiations would be completed by the end of 2006, and the Korean Trade 
Minister Hyun-Jong Kim also stated that the U.S.-Bahrain FTA — signed 
after only two rounds of negotiations — provided an ideal model for the 
U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations.27  Reflecting on this declaration, the U.S.-
Korea FTA negotiations were initially scheduled to take place only through 
to the end of the year, but were then extended until March of the following 
year.28  Even though an agreement was finally reached between the two 
countries after rounds of treacherous negotiations, controversies still 
remain.29  Concern about various provisions of the FTA, particularly in 
 
25 Jae-Joon Heo, Han-Mi FTA, Nodong Shijang, Nosa Gwangae [U.S.-Korea FTA, Labor 
Market, Labor-Management Relationship] (Kor. Lab. Inst., Seoul, S. Kor.), Apr. 23, 2006, 
cited in Cho Sang-Gi, Iljari Jungga Tumuniupko, Dwaerae 'Gujojojong' Wooryu [What 
Does Korea-U.S. FTA Mean to Laborers: Increase in Jobs is Ridiculous, In Fact Concerns 
About Restructuring, LABOR TODAY, Mar. 28, 2007, http://www.labortoday.co.kr/photo/ 
view.asp?arId=70273&pNo=46&mId1=09&mId2=04&sDate=&isView=l. 
26 Won-Hyuk Lim, Visiting Researcher at the Brookings Institute, Washington D.C., held 
the view that the proposed U.S.-Korea FTA was not the proper way to solve this problem in 
the U.S.-Korea relations.  See Won-Hyuk Lim, Roh Moo-Hyun Daetongryungee Nixon 
Daetongryung Dalmattago? [Does the Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun Resemble Nixon?], 
PRESSIAN NEWS, Aug. 30, 2006, www.pressian.com/scripts/section/article.asp?article_num= 
40060830164422&s_menu=%BC%BC%B0%E8. 
27 Portman Press Release, supra note 16. 
28 See supra note 2.  
29 The FTA negotiations between the United States and Korea proceeded expeditiously.  
When compared to the Korea-Japan FTA, which is in a state of deadlock after many years 
of discussions, extensive research work, and six rounds of negotiations, the U.S.-Korea FTA 
was not prepared nearly as well.  One of this article’s authors warned in a previous article 
that if the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations were to continue at the proposed fast pace without 
domestic consensus, many problems could arise.  See Yong-Shik Lee, Korea – USA Free 
Trade Agreement: Issues and Outlook, 15 KOR. FORUM ON INT’L TRADE & BUS. LAW 215 
(2006) [hereinafter Lee, Issues and Outlook].  These problems have indeed occurred, 
including a widespread civil alliance against the U.S.-Korea FTA and strong opposition 
manifested in nationwide rallies in Korea. 
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Korea, still remains.30  Intense demonstrations in opposition to the FTA 
swept through a number of cities in Korea during the negotiations.31  The 
situation in the United States did not appear so promising either, in view of 
the consistent demand by the Senate’s Democratic majority for more 
concessions from Korea before it would consent to the FTA.32 
III. RECENT TRENDS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE U.S.-
KOREA FTA 
A. General Development 
As of December 2008, over 200 regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
were in effect,33 and more than 60% of world trade volume was attributed 
to trades under RTAs. 34   This indicates that along with the WTO’s 
multilateral trading system, the regional trading system based on numerous 
bilateral and multilateral FTAs35 constitutes an integral part of the world 
trading system today.  The number of RTAs has been rapidly increasing 
since the establishment of the WTO.36  The reason for this increase can be 
traced into the growing difficulties for countries to reach agreements in the 
multilateral trading system of the WTO, which is comprised of as many as 
153 countries.37  The WTO member countries have shown significant 
differences in their interests and views, resulting in a deadlock in 
negotiation talks.  Effective resolutions of these different interests through 
the WTO remain very difficult, if not entirely impossible.  The stalled 
 
30 By November 2006, as many as 300 NGOs and labor unions in Korea had formed a civil 
alliance against the U.S.-Korea FTA.  Korea Sees Worst Labor Protests in Years, CHOSUN 
ILBO, Nov. 23, 2006 [hereinafter Labor Protests],  http://english.chosun.com/site/data/ 
html_dir/2006/11/23/2006112361009.html. 
31 On November 22, 2006, over 72,000 demonstrators in 13 cities rallied against the FTA. 
See id. 
32 See supra note 5. 
33 See WORLD TRADE ORG., REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS NOTIFIED TO THE GATT/WTO 
AND IN FORCE (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/eif_e.xls 
[hereinafter WTO RTAs] (listing all GATT/WTO treaties currently in force as of the stated 
date).  To access more comprehensive information about every aspect of RTAs, see 
generally http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. 
34 Mitsuo Matsushita, Legal Aspects of Free Trade Agreements: in the Context of Article 
XXIV of the GATT 1994, in WTO AND EAST ASIA: NEW PERSPECTIVES 497 (Mitsuo 
Matsushita & Dukgeun Ahn eds., 2004).  
35 The number of RTAs was only 27 during the 1970s and the 1980s but increased to 64 in 
the 1990s and over 100 after 2000, rapidly increasing since the establishment of the WTO.  
See generally WTO RTAs, supra note 33. 
36 Id. 
37 See WORLD TRADE ORG., Members and Observers (July 23, 2008), http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
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negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda evidence this difficulty.38  
Accordingly, the current trend of entering into an FTA with other countries 
in the same region or with countries that share similar interests and views is 
expected to intensify.39 
Following this trend, both the United States and Korea, which had 
not been actively engaged in bilateral or multilateral regional trading 
arrangements until the 1990s,40 began to increase efforts to conclude FTAs.  
Korea started with an FTA with Chile in 200441 and then entered into FTAs 
with Singapore, 42  the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 43  the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)44 and India,45 all of 
which are currently in effect.  Korea then completed negotiations FTAs 
with the United States and the European Union.46  Korea is currently 
 
38 The DDA negotiations have just passed their ninth anniversary.  See World Trade 
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 
I.L.M. 746 (2002).  The negotiations are currently bogged down in the swamp of competing 
national interests of 153 members of the WTO in the absence of a long-waited breakthrough. 
39 See Yong-Shik Lee, Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade Liberalization: A 
Viable Answer for Economic Development?, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 701, 702 (2005) 
[hereinafter Lee, FDI]; see also YONG-SHIK LEE, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM 141 (2006) [hereinafter LEE, RECLAIMING] (observing that RTAs “have 
significant effects on international trade because about 90 percent of WTO members, 
including a number of developing country Members, have signed at least one or more 
RTAs.”).  
40 The United States made only two FTAs until the 1990s:  the NAFTA agreement and a 
bilateral FTA with Israel, the latter primarily for political purposes. 
41 Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Chile, Chile-S. 
Kor., Feb. 15, 2003 (entered into force Apr. 1, 2004), available at  http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/ 
fta_korea/chile/eng/Text_of_Agreement.pdf. 
42 Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Singapore, 
Sing.-S. Kor., Aug. 4, 2005 (entered into force Mar. 2, 2006), available at 
 http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/fta_korea/singapore/kor/KSFTA.pdf. 
43 Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the European Union, Eur. Free 
Trade Ass’n-S. Kor., Dec. 15, 2005 (entered into force Sept. 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.fta.go.kr/new/pds/fta_korea/eu/pdf_eng/Full_Text.pdf. 
44 Agreement on Investment Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Among the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the Member Countries 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, June 2, 2009 (entered into force Sept. 1, 
2009). 
45 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the 
Republic of India, India-S. Kor., Aug. 7, 2009 (entered into force Jan. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/fta_korea/india/eng/ALL_OF_CEPA_E.pdf. 
46 Korea and the E.U. signed the Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the 
Republic of Korea and the European Union (Korea-E.U. FTA) on Oct. 6, 2010, and agreed 
to bring the agreement into effect beginning July 1, 2011.  See Press Release, MOFAT, 
Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement to Enter into Force on July 1, 2011 (Sept. 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engboardread.jsp? 
typeID=12&boardid=302&seqno=309370&c=TITLE&t=&pagenum=14&tableName=TYP
E_ENGLISH&pc=undefined&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du=. 
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engaged in FTA negotiations with Canada, Mexico, Australia, New 
Zealand, Peru, Colombia and Japan. 47   Korea has already completed 
preliminary studies for the FTA together with China and is also expected to 
enter into FTA negotiations with China in the near future.48   
On the other hand, since NAFTA with Mexico and Canada, the 
United States has entered into bilateral FTAs with Singapore, Jordan, 
Bahrain, Israel, Chile, CAFTA-DR (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), Australia, Morocco, 
Oman, and Peru.49  The U.S. government has also signed FTAs with Korea, 
Panama, and Colombia.  Currently, FTA negotiations are under way with 
Malaysia, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates.50  The United States is 
also a party to the FTAA negotiations and the Trans-Pacific Partnership.51  
While it has shown interest in making an FTA with Japan, the third largest 
economy in the world, commencement of negotiations has been impeded 
by disputes over agricultural issues.52 
B. Social Impacts of FTA 
The goals of recent FTAs — particularly those promoted by the 
United States — go well beyond removal of trade barriers to promote trade 
in goods and services: they include provisions that are designed to affect a 
broader range of domestic policies, including enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, protection of investment activities, establishment of 
environmental and labor standards, transparency in applications of 
domestic laws and regulations, and establishment of investment dispute 
settlement processes outside national court systems.  This type of FTA is 
designed to bring a range of relevant laws and practices of the signatory 
 
47 The progress of Korea’s various FTA negotiations is chronicled by MOFAT.  See 
MOFAT, FTA Status of Korea, http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/fta/issues/ 
index2.jsp.  The negotiations with Japan have been suspended over agricultural issues since 
November 2004, though “working level consultations” were reestablished from 2008 
onwards.  Yon-Se Kim, Korea, Japan Struggling to Resume FTA Talks, KOR. TIMES, June 
25, 2008, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/11/ 
242_26529.html; see also MOFAT, FTA Status of Korea: Korea-Japan FTA, 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/fta/consideration/Japan/index.jsp.  
48 See Yoo, China, supra note 22, at 1.  A joint feasibility study of the China-Korea FTA, 
composed by academics and representatives of government and industry from both 
countries, was completed on May 28, 2010 after three and half years of work.  They 
produced a report showing that the FTA will contribute to economic cooperation between 
the two countries and the economic integration of the Northeast Asian region. 
49  OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Free Trade Agreements, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.html. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 CHANLETT-AVERY, ISSUES, supra note 18. 
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trading partners in line with those of the United States in order to create a 
favorable regulatory environment for U.S. businesses.53  Provisions of the 
comprehensive FTA also carry certain social and political preferences, such 
as environmental and labor standards, which go beyond the realm of 
traditional trade liberalization.54   
Thus, the comprehensive FTA has potentially significant 
consequences not only for trade practices of the signatory countries, but 
also for their overall economic, cultural, and social policies.55  For example, 
the United States demanded that the screen quota in Korea be reduced as a 
precondition for the initiation of the negotiations of the Korea-U.S. FTA.  
This quota, in fact, does not restrict the import of foreign movie films but 
mandates the number of days that Korean movie theaters must show only 
Korean movies.  The reduction in the screen quota would not only make it 
easier for theatres to show foreign movies, but it would also affect the 
Korean cultural policy of protecting the minimal commercial viability of 
 
53 By way of example, in the course of lengthy negotiations for the U.S.-Korea FTA, each 
the two countries was engaged in intensive research into relevant statutes and precedents of 
the other.  This research concerned both legal and factual aspects and was needed to get an 
accurate glimpse of how the agreement would actually operate in the two countries, mainly 
because the purpose of the agreement is to adjust respective domestic policies in accordance 
with the standards set in the U.S.-Korea FTA.  Although this adjustment would not be 
economic integration per se, it still indicates that close policy coordination, one way or 
another, by the two governments is expected to arise from the agreement.  See Jaemin Lee, 
Minimizing the Aftershocks of the Korea-U.S. FTA: How to Manage Disputes Arising from 
the Two Countries’ Discrepant Perspectives and Legal Systems in On Korea, 2 KEI 
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES 29, 30–33, Feb. 2009, available at http://www.keia.org/ 
Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2008/LeeJaemin.pdf. 
54 On March 27, 2007, Congress announced a “new trade policy,” which calls for the USTR 
to:  
-­ Require countries to adopt, maintain and enforce basic international labor 
standards in their domestic laws and practices – not merely to “enforce their 
own laws.”  
-­ Promote sustainable development and combat global warming by requiring 
countries to implement and enforce common Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, and address illegal logging of mahogany in Peru. 
-­ Re-establish a fair balance between promoting access to medicines in 
developing countries and protecting pharmaceutical innovation.  
-­ Promote U.S. national security by protecting operations at U.S. ports.  
-­ Ensure that [any] trade agreement accords “no greater rights” to foreign 
investors in the U.S. than to U.S. investors. 
Press Release, Trade Subcomm.  Chairman Sander Levin, Rangel and Levin Unveil New 
Trade Policy for America: Plan Incorporates Changes to Strengthen Pending FTAs and 
Regain Bipartisan Consensus (Mar. 27, 2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/ 
press/mi12_levin/pr032707.shtml.  
55 LEE, RECLAIMING, supra note 39, at 151–152.  
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Korean movies and arts.56  On this issue, opinions about the justification for 
the screen quota vary among Koreans, and many have argued that the 
prosperous Korean movie industry no longer requires such protection.  At 
any rate, the Korean government’s cultural and social policies, such as the 
screen quota, which aimed at protecting and preserving cultural activities 
will be challenged under the call for increased market access for foreign 
exports whenever these policies clash with foreign trade interests, 
regardless of whether these policies target foreign trade per se. 
Another hypothetical example is the Korean universal health care 
system, which may prove to be an impediment to the operations of foreign 
for-profit hospitals and insurance companies.  This is because of the 
monopoly the publicly funded system has over primary health care in 
Korea.  If this health care system were to be abolished or reformed in order 
to create a better business environment for foreign hospitals, insurance 
companies and pharmaceutical companies, then the Korean health care 
policy would fundamentally change, as would the way in which health care 
is provided to the Korean population.57  Suspension of the public health 
authorities’ mandatory drug price review and authorization process — or 
limitation of the price regulation mechanism during the review process58 — 
may also be expected to drive up public health insurance premiums to 
cover the higher cost of foreign drugs.  It may then cause difficulty in 
maintaining the currently favorable premium for low-income families, 
which has been an important social policy in Korea.  Although it is still too 
early to tell how the proposed FTA with the United States would implicate 
these important policy areas, these examples do indicate that the promotion 
of a comprehensive or higher level FTA may lead to fundamental changes 
in an array of domestic, social, economic, and cultural policies of the 
signatories.  In this respect, there is a possibility that the U.S.-Korea FTA 
 
56 It is noteworthy that recently the United Nations sponsored a multilateral convention to 
recognize the authority of countries to adopt policies to preserve their respective cultural 
identities, which was accepted almost universally.  See Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of Cultural Diversity, art. 1 para. h, United Nations Educ., Scientific, and 
Cultural Org. (“UNESCO”), Oct. 20, 2005, UNESCO Doc. No. CLT-2005/Convention 
Diversité-Cult. Rev.2, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/ 
142919e.pdf. 
57 The reduction of the screen quota has already been implemented at the request of the 
United States, but the abolition or amendment of the universal health care coverage is only a 
hypothetical example.  Although it has been suggested that the current pharmaceutical 
provisions in the draft FTA can have a significant impact on the Korean health care system, 
the Korean government has neither announced any possibility of abolishing or amending the 
current health care system nor has the United States made any official demand to this effect.  
See infra notes 154 to 158 and accompanying text. 
58 Id. 
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may work as a legal framework that would affect important regulatory and 
policy mechanisms of Korea in a way that Korea has not envisioned.59 
C. Economic Impacts  
FTAs can also have a significant impact on the economic 
development of the signatory countries.  If an FTA is entered into between 
nations that are in different stages of economic development, and as a result 
the trade barriers are abolished, the nation in the lower stages of 
development may lose its ability to adopt trade measures for the protection 
and development of its own industries.  This would entrench the existing 
industrial structure of that nation at the time when the FTA was entered 
into, making it harder for the nation to develop industries in which the 
other trading partner nation had an advantage.60  On the other hand, an 
argument has been made that the opposite effect may be likely, in that the 
FTA may facilitate structural changes.  The latter argument seems to 
highlight that the signatory country may develop industries in which it has 
a competitive advantage, but this argument tends to disregard the critical 
possibility that the FTA may eliminate the potential for nurturing a 
competitive advantage in industries that are not initially competitive vis-à-
vis their foreign counterparts by taking away the ability of the domestic 
government to adopt trade-related industrial policies to protect such 
industries.  If such industries are exposed to full competition by superior 
foreign industries as a result of acceding to an FTA, future development of 
these industries would be very difficult.  For example, if the Korean 
automobile market had been open to foreign imports, as it is now, with 
little or no trade barriers during the 1960s and the 1970s, when the Korean 
automobile industry was in its incipient stage and, therefore, substantially 
weaker than those of Japan or the United States, Korean automobiles would 
have been unable to compete with the superior foreign-made automobiles 
as they do now.  The revenue base of the Korean automobile industry 
 
59 See Chol Lee, Policy Statement, FTA, KORUS FTA, and Challenges of the Labor 
Movement (Aug. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Lee, Challenges], available at http://kctu.org/? 
module=file&act=procFileDownload&file_srl=3267&sid=d8ca1ababfffd479bbd440605527
dd01 (explaining, from Lee Chol’s vantage as Deputy Director at the Policy Department of 
the Federation of Korea Trade Unions [FKTU], the meaning of core provisions of the 
Korea-U.S. FTA as well as reasons for which “it is so problematic” and its consequences for 
organized labor).  
60  See Lee, FDI, supra note 39, at 704–08 (citing Ha-Joon Chang’s study which 
demonstrates that “virtually all developed countries today adopted industrial promotion 
policies [at some stage in their past development history] to establish some manufacturing 
basis with the extensive use of subsidies and trade protections. . . .,” and concluding that 
“trade protection, although discounted by many ‘mainstream’ economists for creating 
economic inefficiency, is closely relevant to development.”). 
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would have been eradicated, and it would have been difficult for the 
industry to grow into the internationally-competitive industry that is 
today.61  
Negative effects on the economic development of the services trade 
may result under the U.S.-Korea FTA.  This is particularly the case in 
current trends of services markets liberalization, where market opening is 
focused on capital-intensive service sectors such as the financial sectors in 
which developed countries have competitive advantage; and less so in areas 
in which developing countries have competitive advantage.  For instance, 
while developing countries can provide ample supply of labor through 
movement of natural persons, this has been, in fact, tightly controlled and 
little market access negotiations have been undertaken in this area because 
of domestic employment and security issues.62  In the aftermath of the 2008 
economic downturn, some countries adopted immigration regulation that 
further restricted the opportunities for foreign service providers to provide 
services in their domestic service markets.63  Even if reasonable labor 
market opening was to be agreed on, the unique difficulties associated with 
the movement of labor, such as language barriers, cultural differences, and 
the hardships of family separation, would make it rather difficult for 
developing countries to enjoy their competitive advantage of having a large 
 
61 There is substantial debate around the validity of infant industry promotion policy.  See 
LEE, RECLAIMING, supra note 39, ch. 3.1 (explaining that in order to understand the true 
relationship between economic development and government promotion of homegrown 
industries, “[i]t is essential to consider historic and empirical evidence. . . .”).  Nonetheless, 
recent historical studies have shown that today’s developed countries developed their 
economies in the past through various government industrial facilitation policies and trade 
protection.  See HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ch. 2 (2003); see also supra note 60. 
62 Some bilateral FTA negotiations have expanded the number of “working visas” to be 
granted to parties’ professional service workers.  This indicates the close relationship 
between opening of service markets and immigration regulation.  Tight immigration 
regulation would carry the potential of virtually vitiating or reducing the actual benefit of 
service market opening. 
63 See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Div. A, Title XVI, § 1611 
(2009).  Section 1611 is called the “Employ American Workers Act.”  This Act regards 
recipients of funding from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) as “H-1B Dependent 
Employers” under the relevant U.S. immigration regulation (i.e., 20 C.F.R. § 655.736 
(2001)) and imposes tight restrictions on these companies’ recruitment of foreign 
professional service providers.  As a consequence, all things being equal, these companies 
and other companies who may envision future application for TARP funding refrain from 
employing foreign professional service providers who are willing to provide their services in 
the U.S. market.  This may negatively affect the penetration of foreign service providers in 
the U.S. service market, even if the market is open in a technical or legal sense; see also 
Joint Press Statement, E.U.-ROK 2010 Brussels Summit (Oct. 7, 2010), available at 
 http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/press/MinistryNews/20101007/1_13155.jsp (reporting the 
content of E.U. and Korean leaders’ announcements after signing the Korea-E.U. FTA at the 
2010 E.U.-ROK summit). 
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amount of low cost labor in the services trade.  For this reason, the 
liberalization of the service trade will arguably offer more export benefits 
to developed countries than developing ones.  
As will be discussed later, the U.S.-Korea FTA service 
negotiations seem to have reflected this trend, and the focus of the 
agreement was on the liberalization of capital-intensive service markets 
such as financial services and broadcasting services.  The U.S. service 
industries are expected to benefit more from the liberalization of services 
trade under the FTA, while the export benefits to the Korean service 
industries are expected to be limited by the significant gap in the 
productivity between the two countries’ service industries.64  Many U.S. 
service industries are among the most competitive in the world even though 
the recent financial crisis revealed problems with their operations.  If 
Korean service industries, which are smaller in size and have lower 
productivity, face open competition with the larger and more efficient U.S. 
service industries, they may well lose their domestic sales base, and their 
growth potential will probably be negatively affected. 65   This could 
potentially lead to a long-term domestic economic loss outweighing the 
short-term increases in consumer welfare and gross domestic product (GDP) 
gains66 from the higher economic efficiency resulting from free trade in this 
area.    
Liberalization of the services trade under the FTA will potentially 
have a much more significant economic impact than liberalization of the 
goods market, where trade barriers have consistently been lowered since 
the GATT era.67  Trade liberalization in the service area only began after 
 
64 See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], OECD in 
Figures 2005: Statistics on the Member Countries, (Oct. 27, 2005) [hereinafter OECD, 
Figures] http://www.oecd.org/document/62/0,3746,en_2825_500246_2345918_1_1_1_1 
,00.html (showing that the average labor productivity of Korean service industries is 
reported at around 40% of that of the United States).  According to the Korea Institute for 
International Economic Policy (KIEP), if 20% of the trade barriers were lifted the Korean 
trade balance in the service industries would worsen by US$1.8 billion. 
65 Some have argued that this type of protectionism is a form of Mercantilism.  However, 
this position is distinct from traditional Mercantilism in the sense that the focus of the 
protection is on growth potential rather than on the current state of an industry and its profits 
against foreign competitors. 
66 According to KIEP, consumer welfare and real GDP in Korea after the U.S.-Korea FTA 
will increase by 1.73% and 1.99%, respectively.  See Han-Mi FTA Chaegyul Ttae Shiljil 
GDP 1.99% Jungga [After Conclusion of the Korea-U.S. FTA Real GDP Will Increase by 
1.99%], CHOSUN ILBO (Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.chosun.com/economy/news/200601/ 
200601190356.html. But see USITC estimate that the impact of the U.S.-Korea FTA on 
economic growth will be much smaller, with GDP “increas[ing only] by 0.2% [for the 
United States and 0.7% for Korea] as a result of the FTA.”  USITC, Impact, supra note 15, 
at 5-2. 
67 Since the establishment of the GATT, eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations were 
completed.  In each round, tariffs were successfully lowered by an average rate of 35%.  As 
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the establishment of the WTO in 1995.  The degree of liberalization 
remains low because WTO members have been somewhat reluctant to 
commit to opening their services market while the economic impact of 
market opening remains uncertain.  Arguments have been raised that 
opening up the services market under the FTA will not only benefit the U.S. 
service industries but also those of Korea, the competitiveness of which 
could further improve through competition with the U.S. industries. 68  
However, more research would be necessary to determine whether the 
current competitiveness of the Korean service industries will allow any 
meaningful competition with the U.S. counterparts.69  From the perspective 
of industrial development, it is pertinent to question whether the Korean 
service markets should be opened up incrementally, as opposed to 
undergoing an immediate and radical liberalization.70  The incremental 
approach could be modeled after the gradual trade liberalization of the 
automobile market, which resulted in the successful industrial development 
of Korea’s automobile industry.71 
There is concern that the proposed U.S.-Korea FTA, particularly 
the liberalization of the services trade, may also worsen the economic 
polarization in Korea that has been accelerating since the financial crisis in 
1997.72  If the large scale, capital-intensive U.S. service industries were to 
 
a result, after the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994 the average import tariff rate applied 
to manufactured products by developed nations was a mere 3.9%.  JOHN H. JACKSON, THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 74 (2nd ed. 1997). 
68 Kyung-Chul Sun, Briefing to the Korean Government on the U.S.-Korea FTA: To 
Become a First Class Nation (Mar. 22, 2006), available at  www.fta.go.kr/fta_korea/ 
interview_view.php?page=1&board_id=989&country_id=19. 
69 According to preliminary research conducted by USITC, Korea’s service exports are 
expected to decrease by over 5% under the U.S.-Korea FTA, which seems to indicate 
deterioration rather than improvement in competitiveness of Korean service industries.  
USITC, Impact, supra note 15, at 5-12. 
70 The opening of the Korean service market may also be prompted by the result of the 
WTO’s currently on-going DDA negotiations, if they are successfully completed in the near 
future.  As of this writing, it is difficult to predict the extent and terms of the DDA-imposed 
market opening of the Korean service market.  If Korea, as a result of the DDA negotiations, 
assumes an obligation to open up its service market to a similar level as that envisioned in 
the U.S.-Korea FTA, discussion of the prospective impact on the Korean services market 
from the U.S.-Korea FTA would become moot.  As the outcome of the DDA is hard to 
predict at the moment, the discussion in this paper on this issue is premised on the notion 
that the current services trade regime of Korea under the WTO remains the same for the 
time being. 
71 Hang-Koo Lee, Carmakers Succeeded in Localizing Foreign Models, KOR. TIMES (July 9, 
2010), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2010/12/291_69133.html. 
72 According to a recent report of the Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy, the Gini 
Coefficient worsened from 0.283 in 1997 to 0.310 in 2004 (the value of the Gini Coefficient 
ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 represents the highest income inequality).  Jong-Hak Weon & 
Myung-Jae Sung, Sodeugbunbae Gyeogcha Hwagdaeui Woningwa Jeongchaegdaeeung 
Banghyang [Causes of Increasing Income Inequality in Korea and Policy Suggestions], 
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actively enter the Korean services market, those Korean individuals and 
companies that have the ability and the capital to cooperate with them will 
share in some portion of the profits.  Meanwhile, the domestic service 
suppliers operating with relatively smaller capital will probably be 
excluded, and could experience significant difficulties in attempting to stay 
in business. 73   Although consumer welfare can increase through the 
advancement of these efficient foreign service industries,74 and perhaps 
more jobs may also be created,75 especially in temporary employment, if 
the domestic service industries collapse because they are unable to compete, 
then the resulting loss of individual businesses, combined with the 
unemployment problem expected in the agricultural sector after the FTA,76 
may actually have the effect of further polarizing the Korean society rather 
than bridging it.77  To many observers of this agreement, this perceived 
worsening of the economic polarization in Korea has been a cause for 
concern.78 
 
KOR. INST. OF PUB. FIN. RESEARCH REPORTS (2007), available at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CBsQFjAB&url=http%3A%2
F%2F210.218.195.13%2Fbook_pdf%2F%25EC%2597%25B0%25EB%25B3%25B407-
10_50.pdf&ei=JNiBTdzbN9DdgQfbn7S9CA&usg=AFQjCNG0ObBHXH1DVA1ifKsfe0R
O7Jcvhw&sig2=cDqISS1L6bNnhrwJjzMD9A (in Korean, with English-language abstract 
at the end). 
73 This situation will be analogous to the dominance of big chain stores, such as Wal-Mart in 
the U.S. retail market, and the consequent elimination of small, independent retail stores in 
past decades. 
74 USITC, Impact, supra note 15, at 5-2. 
75 KIEP has estimated that around 100,000 jobs will be created.  After Conclusion of the 
Korea-U.S. FTA Real GDP Will Increase by 1.99%, CHOSUN ILBO, supra note 66.  But see 
USITC, Impact, supra note 15, at 5-15 (indicating that the expected change in demand for 
labor in the Korean service sector will be minimal, or less than 0.5%, which indicates that 
the job increase, if any, will be insignificant). 
76 See JIN-KYO SUH & JI-HYUN PARK, Issues in the Agricultural Negotiation of a Korean-
U.S. FTA Negotiation and Korea’s Strategies (2007) [hereinafter SUH & PARK, ISSUES] 
(estimating that 130,000 to 140,000 jobs will be lost in the agricultural sector),  
http://www.kiep.go.kr/include/filedown.jsp?fname=PAIK200619.pdf&fpath=Pub0201&NO
=180389&FNO=864 (in Korean, with English-language abstract at the end).  See infra notes 
90 to 95 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of agricultural issues and the 
FTA. 
77 See JIN-KYO SUH & JI-HYUN PARK, Issues in the Agricultural Negotiation of a Korean-
U.S. FTA Negotiation and Korea’s Strategies (2007) [hereinafter SUH & PARK, ISSUES] 
(estimating that 130,000 to 140,000 jobs will be lost in the agricultural sector), available at 
http://www.kiep.go.kr/include/filedown.jsp?fname=PAIK200619.pdf&fpath=Pub0201&NO
=180389&FNO=864 (in Korean, with English-language abstract at the end).  See infra notes 
90 to 95 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of agricultural issues and the 
FTA. 
78 Korean Minister of Finance and Economy Duk-Soo Han asserted at a workshop held by 
Korea’s ruling party (Apr. 2, 2006) that reinforcing the social safety network to help 
socially-disadvantaged classes is in line with the U.S.-Korea FTA. 
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Moreover, the liberalization of the services market under the FTA 
may have to be extended beyond the trade between the United States and 
Korea by operation of relevant WTO rules.  According to relevant 
provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), if 
service industries are opened up through the U.S.-Korea FTA, the door 
may also have to be opened to the other WTO member nations that provide 
such services in either of these countries through local investment.  The 
exclusive preferential treatment under an FTA is allowed as an exception to 
the requirement of the most favored nation (MFN) principle that prevents 
arbitrary discriminations among trading partners. Article 2 of GATS 
requires MFN treatment for services trade,79 and GATS Article 5 authorizes 
FTAs as an exception to the MFN principle, allowing preferential treatment 
under an FTA to be applied exclusively to the trade between the signatories 
of that FTA.80  However, even with the GATS Article 5 exception, if a 
service supplier is incorporated under the laws of the FTA signatory 
country it is regarded as qualified to receive the full FTA privileges of 
service suppliers from that country, even though in some sense this supplier 
is not originally from the particular FTA signatory country.81 
Therefore, some consideration should be given to this (perhaps) 
unintended result.  If the services markets were to be opened under the 
U.S.-Korea FTA, it may in effect become opened to service providers from 
other WTO members that are incorporated in either the United States or 
Korea.  It should also be noted that the reciprocity between the signatories 
of the FTA does not apply to these other WTO members: they do not have 
to open their own services market beyond the concessions which they have 
already made in the WTO multilateral trade negotiations.  Nevertheless, 
these member countries will enjoy, albeit indirectly, the benefit of the 
service market liberalization under the FTA if their service suppliers 
provide services through corporations set up in one of the signatory 
countries.  Consequently, by operation of GATS Article 5.6, the signatories 
of the FTA may also lose their negotiation leverage in WTO service trade 
negotiations to the extent that they have or will have opened their services 
market to service providers from non-FTA signatory WTO members and 
which are incorporated in the signatory countries.  As such, the total benefit 
 
79 See General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS] art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, in 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 287 (1999) [hereinafter WTO, THE LEGAL TEXTS] 
(providing in article 2(1) that “each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally 
to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that 
it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country. . . .”); available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm. 
80 GATS art. 5. 
81 Id. para. 5. 
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from the services market opening through an FTA would require careful 
consideration of all these multi-dimensional issues beyond enhancement of 
competition and consumer welfare.  
IV. KEY ISSUES IN THE U.S.-KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
A. Overall Observations 
The U.S.-Korea FTA proposes to achieve massive trade 
liberalization, by removing over 90% tariffs for manufactured products in 
three years, and eventually eliminating all of them; all market restrictions 
are to be lifted for agricultural products except rice.82  Yet, the overall 
prospect of the U.S.-Korea FTA would only become ascertainable if one 
would scrutinize how the bilateral trade actually plays out under the 
agreement.  For instance, regardless of reciprocal elimination or reduction 
of tariffs, the application of the rule to the actual situation may lead to 
imbalance in trade benefits expected to result from the agreement.  Korea’s 
major export industries such as automobiles, shipbuilding, electronics and 
semiconductors, are not expected to benefit much under the FTA because 
U.S. import tariffs on these products are already low, ranging from 0% to 
2.5%.83  In addition, the recent experience of Korea is that the actual 
impediments to Korean exports to the United States are U.S. antidumping 
measures, countervailing duties, and extraterritorial applications of antitrust 
laws, rather than tariffs.84  All major Korean exporters in these areas have 
had vivid experience in coping with these measures of the United States.85  
 
82 See Press Release, MOFAT, Han-Mi Jayu Muyeog Hyeobjeong (FTA) Bunyabyeol 
Choejong Hyeobsang Gyeolgwa [Final Korea-U.S. FTA Negotiation Results for Each 
Sector] (Apr. 4, 2007) [hereinafter MOFAT, Final Negotiation Results], 
http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/broadpsd.asp?country_idx=19 (use arrows to look for 
press release no. 112, dated Feb. 4, 2007).  See generally USITC, USITC PUB. 3949, U.S.-
KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: POTENTIAL ECONOMY-WIDE AND SELECTED SECTORAL 
EFFECTS (Inv. No. TA-2104-24, 2007), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/ 
pub3949.pdf.  
83 It has also been pointed out that the rapidly increasing overseas production of Korean 
export industries will diminish the benefits from the FTA.  See Lee Hae-Yeong Kyosu 'Han-
Mi FTA, Choidae Gukjae Sagigug [Professor Hae-Yeong Lee: ‘Korea-U.S. FTA Is Worst 
International Fraud], CHOSUN ILBO, June 16, 2007, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/ 
html_dir/2007/06/16/2007061600073.html. 
84 Seventy-five antidumping and countervailing duty investigations were initiated by the 
United States against Korean exports from 1965 to 2005, and a total of US$37.3 billion 
worth of Korean exports were subjected to U.S. trade measures from 1985 to 2005.  KOREA 
TRADE COMMISSION, MUYEOGGUJE GWANLYEON TONG-GYE [FOREIGN TRADE REMEDY 
INVESTIGATION STATISTICS] (2010), available at http://www.ktc.go.kr/kboard/view.jsp?bm 
=15&pg=1&bd=999999925 [hereinafter KTC, STATISTICS]. 
85 If trade disputes provide any reliable barometer for the extent of the trade measures that 
Korean exporters face, during the 2007-2008 period when the U.S.-Korea FTA was agreed 
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Particularly, antidumping investigations by the United States against 
Korean exporters have been a perennial source of concern for both industry 
and the government.86  Unfortunately, it is apparent that the United States is 
not prepared to remove these barriers for the benefit of Korean exports.  
Former USTR Rob Portman declared that the United States would not 
change its laws and systems because of the U.S.-Korea FTA, which would 
govern those trade measures.87  Thus, an argument can be made that Korean 
exporters will continue to deal with their major hurdles even in the post-
U.S.-Korea FTA era, while their U.S. counterparts, particularly in the areas 
of agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and services, stand to gain significantly.88  
The result from these imbalanced FTA gains has the potential of shifting 
the overall trade balance more in favor of the United States.  According to 
 
upon and legislative ratifications were pursued, there were eight disputes at the WTO 
dispute settlement procedure that involved various trade frictions between the two countries, 
either as direct parties or indirect parties (i.e., third parties).  See Panel Report, European 
Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R (June 30, 
2010); Appellate Body Report, United States — Continued Existence and Application of 
Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009); Appellate Body Report, United 
States — Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand, WT/DS343/AB/R (July 16, 2008); 
Appellate Body Report, Japan — Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access 
Memories from Korea, WT/DS336/AB/R (Nov. 28, 2007); Panel Report, United States — 
Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador, WT/DS335/R (Jan. 30, 2007); Appellate 
Body Report, United States — Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, 
WT/DS322/AB/R (Jan. 9, 2007); Request for Consultations by the United States, European 
Communities and Certain Member States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft — Second Complaint, WT/DS347/1 (Jan. 31, 2006); Appellate Body Report, United 
States — Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing), 
WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 2006); Request for Consultations by the European 
Communities, United States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft — Second 
Complaint, WT/DS353/1 (June 27, 2005); Request for Consultations by the European 
Communities, United States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
WT/DS317/1 (Oct. 6, 2004). These cases are compiled and made available at WORLD TRADE 
ORG., Chronological List of Disputes Cases,  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
dispu_status_e.htm.  In these disputes, Korea and the United States have shown sharply 
divided opinions on key trade issues.  In the same time period, there were five separate 
investigations by the U.S. government into a wide range of governmental policies of Korea 
for various subsidy allegations, while there were none initiated by Korea against the United 
States. 
86 During the period of 1995–2008, the United States initiated twenty-nine antidumping 
investigations against Korea.  Among the antidumping duty orders that followed from these 
investigations, eleven orders from the United States Department of Commerce are still in 
place.  KOREA TRADE COMMISSION, FOREIGN TRADE REMEDY INVESTIGATIONS STATISTICS, 
supra note 83. 
87 Letter from Rob Portman, U.S. Trade Rep., to Ted Stevens, President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate, and Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House (Feb. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Portman, 
Letter], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-02-02/html/CREC-2006-
02-02-pt1-PgS503.htm. 
88 See supra notes 15 and 64. 
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the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), Korea’s 
current trade surplus with the United States will shrink by US$5.1 billion.  
The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) estimates that 
reduction at US$9 billion.   
With this overall picture of imbalance in the background, a series 
of key issues emerged in the negotiations for the U.S.-Korea FTA.  
Significant disagreements arose in certain areas, including agriculture, 
textiles, pharmaceuticals, services, intellectual property rights, investment, 
government procurement, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
environment and labor, regulatory issues, trade measures, and rules of 
origin.  As discussed above, some of these issues go beyond removal of 
trade barriers per se and have far-reaching effects on an array of domestic 
policies.  In most areas, the two countries attempted to strike a balance of 
interests between the two and in the process U.S. demands were largely 
accommodated by the Korean government. However, it is not entirely clear 
whether Korea could garner tangible benefits in some of its key interest 
areas, including trade remedy measures, working visa issues, coastal 
shipping services, and rules of origin issues with respect to textiles.89  The 
remainder of this section provides a discussion of the negotiated results of 
the U.S.-Korea FTA in selected areas and their implications. 
B. Agriculture and Textiles 
One of the most critical issues in the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations 
was agriculture.  The United States has been demanding removal of tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers in agricultural trade in various bilateral and 
multilateral trade negotiations, and this negotiation stance was also 
expected in the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations.  The agriculture issue, which 
had been the main deterrent keeping Japan and Switzerland from entering 
into an FTA with the United States, was no less critical for Korea, where 
opening the agricultural market was expected to cause critical injury to its 
agricultural sector.  The success of the U.S.-Korea FTA had depended 
largely on the outcome of the negotiations in this area. 
 
89 Other commentators also pointed out that to have an FTA with Korea, the United States 
would have to set aside long-standing trade barriers to Korean exports and resolve visa 
issues in return for the gains from the areas of U.S. interest, such as agriculture.  See, e.g., 
Jeffrey J. Schott et al., Negotiating the Korea – United States Free Trade Agreement 14 
(Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Policy Brief No. PB06-4, 2006) [hereinafter Schott, 
Negotiating], http://www.piie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=639 (“If the 
United States wants an FTA with Korea, it will have to put long-standing US barriers to 
Korean exports on the negotiating table and resolve vexing problems regarding access to the 
US visa waiver program.”).  However, Korea agreed to the FTA without attaining most of 
these key interests.  
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The Korean agriculture sector in most product groups is 
significantly less competitive than its U.S. counterpart.  The 2001 USITC 
report estimated that the export of U.S. agricultural goods to Korea would 
increase by 200% once the FTA comes into effect.90  Research by the 
Korea Rural Economic Institute (KREI) also estimated that Korean 
production would decrease by US$20-23 billion, and that 130,000 to 
140,000 jobs would be lost in the agricultural sector.91  Opening up the 
agriculture sector goes directly to the question of the very survival of 
Korean agriculture.  The expected job losses, mounting to the hundreds of 
thousands, could not only further aggravate the economic polarization 
problem discussed in the preceding section, but also cause massive 
desertion of agricultural areas.  In turn, this would lead to serious social, 
environmental, and economic problems for Korea, which maintained the 
position that effective relief for the affected farmers and plans to improve 
agricultural competitiveness should precede the liberalization of the 
agriculture sector. 
There has been also another fundamental issue with respect to the 
opening of the agriculture market.  Agricultural trade has been already 
distorted by large government subsidies that are allowed in the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture, and a question is raised whether it could be 
justified to call for the opening of the agricultural market where exported 
agricultural products have been subsidized by the government.  In 2006, 
U.S. agriculture subsidies amounted to US$24.4 billion, which was 10.2% 
of the total agricultural production, whereas Korean subsidies were only 
US$2.4 billion, or 6.4% of the total production.92  While consumer welfare 
in the agriculture importing countries could increase thanks to the cheaper 
imported agricultural products, it would be done at the expense of domestic 
agricultural producers, and competition between domestic and imported 
agricultural products would not be fair to domestic producers when the 
exporting country subsidizes production of its agricultural products.  The 
call for liberalization of agricultural trade seems to be misplaced unless 
government subsidies were ultimately removed; and real comparative 
advantages could only be reflected in agricultural trade free of the current 
trade distortions caused by agricultural subsidies. 
In the final state of the negotiation, Korea agreed to provide market 
access to all agricultural products except rice, notwithstanding the issues 
raised above.  According to the USTR, almost two-thirds of U.S. 
 
90 USITC, Impact, supra note 15, at 5-1. 
91 SUH & PARK, ISSUES, supra note 76. 
92 OECD Database, PRODUCER AND CONSUMER SUPPORT ESTIMATES DATABASE, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3746,en_2649_33797_39551355_1_1_1_1,00&&en-
USS_01DBC.html, cited in YOUN-JOONG KIM ET AL., KOR. RURAL ECON. INST., 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KOREAN AGRICULTURE BY STATISTICAL DATA 
(2009). 
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agricultural exports will be immediately duty-free (US$1.91 billion duty 
free out of US$2.96 billion 2004-2006 averages).  Current tariffs for the 
remaining products, including beef and pork, will be eliminated after a 
transitional period ranging from two to twenty years, with an exception of a 
small number of specified items.93  The parties have also agreed on new 
tariff rate quotas (TRQ) for specific items, to be applied up until those 
tariffs are completely eliminated.94  Any tariffs on goods that are not 
specified in the TRQ schedule will be progressively eliminated.95 
Textiles were another key area for the FTA negotiations.  Textile 
and clothing products were finally incorporated into the open trading 
regime under the WTO after the expiration of the Agreement on Textile and 
Clothing in January 2005.  Korea is a net exporter of textile products and 
pressed the United States in the FTA negotiations to increase market access 
and relax its rules of origin, so-called “yarn-forwarding,” to promote 
exports of Korean textile products into the U.S. market.  In turn, the United 
States demanded the adoption of a special safeguard against rapid increases 
in textile imports to protect its domestic textile producers.  Both parties 
have agreed to eliminate tariffs for all textile and clothing products in ten 
years, with an immediate tariff elimination for 87% of the product items 
imported into the United States and 97% of those imported into Korea, 
respectively.96  Both countries have also agreed on a special safeguard 
mechanism allowing imposition of tariffs on the occurrence of injury 
following unexpected import surges.97 
The United States and Korea also showed considerable differences 
on the standards to determine the rule of origin in the textile area.  The 
principal issue was the “yarn-forward” rule adopted by the United States, 
which requires the yarn and fabric used in apparel to come from either the 
United States or the trading partner in question for textile products to be 
recognized as made in that trading partner country.  Korea imports most of 
its yarn from third countries to make textile products, and consequently 
these products will not qualify for non-tariff treatment under this rule of 
origin.98  Nevertheless, the controversial “yarn-forward” rule has still been 
agreed on, with certain product exceptions in Korea’s interest. 99  
 
93 See, e.g., Trade Facts: Free Trade with Korea – Detailed Summary of the KORUS FTA, 
USTR FTA Fact Sheet (Office of the US Trade Representative, Apr. 2007) [hereinafter 
USTR, Fact Sheet], available at www.amchamkorea.org/publications/Download.php?id= 
128. 
94 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 3.2, para. 1.   
95 Id. art. 2.3, para. 2. 
96 MOFAT, Final Negotiation Results, supra note 82.  
97 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1. 
98 Chan-Hee Kim, Double Standard on Rules of Origin, KOOKMIN ILBO, Nov. 1, 2006 (in 
Korean). 
99 MOFAT, Final Negotiation Results, supra note 82. 
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Interestingly, the United States took an apparently opposite approach with 
respect to bovine meat.  The United States demanded the “country of 
slaughter” rule to be used instead of “born, raised and slaughtered (BRS)” 
rule of origin.100  Under the “country of slaughter” rule, cattle raised in 
Canada and slaughtered in the United States will be conferred a U.S. 
country of origin.  This was a cause for concern on the part of Korea 
because of the occurrence of “mad cow disease” in Canadian cattle,101 but 
the parties ultimately agreed on this rule.   
C. Access to Services Market 
The services sector is the area in which the United States has 
competitive advantage,102 and, therefore, the United States would make 
significant efforts to expand entry into the Korean services market.  To this 
end, the United States raised a number of regulatory issues related to the 
entry into the Korean market, in an effort to remove regulatory barriers to 
U.S. service export.  The United States adopted a comprehensive approach: 
i.e. opening up various service sectors at the same time, including finances, 
telecommunications, professional services markets, and other service-
related industries.  As discussed in the preceding section, the economic and 
social effects of liberalizing the services trade can be more far-reaching 
than in goods trade; nevertheless, the two countries seemed to have 
proceeded with negotiations with regard to the liberalization of services 
trade without sufficient research on its impact on relevant service sectors 
and on the economy and society at large.103  
The negotiators on both sides identified areas of services for which 
market access request was made.  These areas included financial services, 
 
100 Id. 
101 Since May 2003, there have been 17 instances of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE) in Canada.  On the other hand, the United States has had only three instances of BSE 
in this same period.  See Overview of BSE in North America, CDC.GOV, 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/bse (last visited Mar. 17, 2011) (using a visual diagram to 
report incidence of BSE cases in the U.S. and Canada from 1993 to 2011). 
102 OECD, Figures, supra note 64, at 30-33.  There is a significant gap in the productivity of 
services industries between the United States and Korea. 
103 From the Korean point of view, perhaps this impact is now more limited than expected 
because the USTR clarified that it was neither seeking to change the non-profit requirement 
of the Korean health care and education systems, nor to have these markets opened to 
relevant U.S. service providers.  See Press Release, MOFAT, Han-mi FTA Je 1 Cha 
Gongsig Hyeobsang Gyeolgwa [Results of the First Round of Official Korea-U.S. FTA 
Negotiations] (June 9, 2006) [hereinafter MOFAT, First Round], 
http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/broadpsd.asp?country_idx=19 (use arrows to look for 
press release no. 34, dated June 9, 2006).  Nonetheless, the opening of the services market 
without due consideration of its various potential impacts may lead to unanticipated 
economic and social problems in the future. 
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professional services, telecommunications, electronic commerce, and 
broadcasting.  Both countries have agreed to adopt a Mutual Recognition 
Arrangement (MRA) for veterinarians, architects, and engineers. 104  
However, the United States has not conceded on the issue of temporary 
visas for corporate executives and the visa quota for professionals.105  
Korea also requested the U.S. coastal shipping market be opened to Korean 
shippers, but it was not accepted by the United States.106  There were 
discussions as to whether the FTA should be applied to the Korea 
Development Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea which mainly operate as 
commercial banks but which sometimes take the role of conduit of 
governmental policy loan programs.  They have been included in the 
reservation list along with Korea Housing Finance Corporation, the 
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, and the National Federation 
of Fisheries Cooperatives.107  The United States also exerted pressure on 
Korea to open its broadcasting market.  According to the proposed U.S.-
Korea FTA, both countries are to afford the MFN treatment to other 
country’s broadcasting companies.108  Each country may place competitive 
safeguards in order to prevent anti-competitive practices such as cross-
subsidization.109  
As for financial services, in which a number of issues were raised, 
the operation of insurance business is limited to subsidiary services such as 
damages adjustment under the proposed FTA.  The parties have also agreed 
not to recognize the capital of the foreign headquarters as part of the 
required capital for foreign bank branches.110  The United States has also 
agreed on a cap on the foreign-owned shares in the ownership of the 
Korean Stock Exchange when it is to be publicly traded.111   As for 
telecommunications services, the United States demanded abolition of the 
49% cap of share ownership by foreigners in the core telecommunications 
businesses to which Korea agreed to do so within two years.112  The United 
 
104 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, at annex 12-A, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/ 
default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file315_12711.pdf (providing that 
“[w]here the Parties agree, each Party shall . . . develop procedures for the temporary 
licensing arrangements of professional service suppliers of the other Party with respect to 
professional services sectors or subsectors mutually agreed by the Parties). 
105 Id. art. 12.1, para. 7. 
106 Id. U.S. annex II. 
107 Id. Korea annex III-22. 
108 Id. art. 18.1, para. 6. 
109 Id. art. 14.5. 
110 Id. art. 11.14, para. 1. 
111 Press Briefing, MOFAT, Han-Mi FTA Je 7 Cha Gongsig Hyeobsang Gyeolgwa, [Results 
of the Seventh Round of Official Korea-U.S. FTA Negotiations] [hereinafter MOFAT, 
Seventh Round Results] (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/broadpsd.asp? 
country_idx=19 (use arrows to look for press release no. 86, dated Feb. 20, 2007). 
112 USTR, Fact Sheet, supra note 93. 
2011]  THE UNITED STATES – KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT        139            
 
States also demanded that private businesses be allowed to choose 
technical standards.113  In accordance with this demand, safeguard rules 
were to be laid down concerning government measures to mandate the use 
of specific technologies.114  An agreement has also been made to provide 
foreign operators with conditional access to existing telecommunication 
networks and facilities.115   
D.  Intellectual Property Rights 
IPR issues go beyond trade, because it has significant impact on 
technological development, national economy, and society at large.  Trade-
related intellectual property rights are controlled by relevant WTO regimes, 
namely the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement), but criticism has been raised as to 
whether the IPR issues should be internationally regulated through the rules 
of international trade.116  The United States produces the largest number of 
patents in the world and has extensive research and development 
capabilities.  The United States has thus strategically recognized IPR as an 
area where it can be competitive in the 21st century, and succeeded in 
getting extensive IPR provisions included as part of the WTO Agreements 
in the Uruguay Round.  Since then, the United States has included 
provisions for a high level of IPR protection in its bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements.  As expected, the United States demanded strong IPR 
protection during the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations.   
While protection of IPR is justified to encourage innovations that 
often require costly research and development efforts, it should also be 
balanced against the need for dissemination of information.117  Excessive 
IPR protection in extent and duration may retard free flow of information 
and ultimately impede development of industries, science, and even culture 
and arts.  This disadvantage would be more substantial for developing 
countries in need of advanced technologies for their development 
 
113 MOFAT, Seventh Round Results, supra note 111. 
114 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, annex 14.21, para. 5 (providing that in ‘adopt[ing] a 
measure that mandates the use of a specific technology of standard, or otherwise limits a 
supplier’s ability to choose the technology it uses, to supply a telecommunications or value-
added service’, either party to the FTA shall use a rulemaking process that affords notice 
and comment opportunities to such suppliers, and permits them to request additional 
rulemakings concerning “alternative technolog[ies] or standard[s]”). 
115 Id. art. 14.2, paras. 5–6. 
116 LEE, RECLAIMING, supra note 39, 123–32. 
117 See Preamble to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], in WTO, THE LEGAL 
TEXTS, supra note 78, at 321; available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm1_e.htm.  
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purposes.118  There is a tendency for developed countries to push for more 
IPR protection, while developing countries demand fair and affordable 
chances to obtain advanced technologies and knowledge for their 
development needs.119  The TRIPS Agreement already offers substantial 
IPR protection under the multilateral framework.  Under these 
circumstances, there should be clear justification as to why it is necessary 
to require an even higher level of protection in the FTA context exceeding 
the IPR protection that the TRIPS Agreement already offers.  The level of 
IPR protection demanded under the U.S.-Korea FTA exceeds that of the 
TRIPS Agreement as discussed below, but it is not clear whether the U.S.-
Korea FTA offers such justification. 
IPR provisions in the U.S.-Korea FTA exceed TRIPS Agreement 
provisions in terms of the duration, extent, and enforcement of IPRs.  For 
instance, both countries have agreed to extend the duration of copyright to 
a period of 70 years after the death of the writer,120 which exceeds the 
TRIPS Agreement requirement of 50 years.121  For another example, USTR 
describes the trademark protection under the FTA as a “state of the art” 
because, among other things, trademark protection extends not only to 
certification of conventional marks for trade but also to sound and scent 
marks.  Online registration of trademarks is also to be protected.  In 
addition, both countries have agreed to facilitate a searchable database and 
to not impose any registration requirement for license to establish the 
validity of the license.122  It is true that uncharted territories were covered 
by the agreement to strengthen the scope of the IPR protection, but clear 
justification in departing from the TRIPS Agreement has yet to come.  
Controversy has also risen over the Confirmation Letter on Online 
Piracy Prevention under Article 18 of the FTA.123  In the Letter, the Korean 
government stated its commitment to shut down internet sites that allow 
unauthorized reproduction, distribution, or transmission of copyrighted 
works.124  Internet site operators have opposed this provision as an overly 
excessive measure because it imposes a unilateral obligation on Korea, not 
 
118 See id. (recognizing the “special needs of the least-developed country Members in 
respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in 
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base[.]”). 
119 Id. 
120 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 18.4, para. 4. MOFAT, Final Negotiation Results, supra 
note 82. 
121 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 116, art. 12. 
122 USTR, Fact Sheet, supra note 93. 
123 Confirmation Letter on Online Piracy Prevention under Article 18 of the FTA, from 
Hyun-Chong Kim, Minister for Trade of the Republic of Kor., to Susan C. Schwab, USTR 
Ambassador (June 30, 2007), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file939_1
2739.pdf. 
124 Id. 
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the United States, and authorizes the Korean government to shut down 
internet sites even for a single occurrence of copyright infringement.125  
Another Letter on Limitations of Liability of Internet Service Providers 
also is a cause for concern as it requires disclosure of the identity and 
contact information of the subscribers who posted unauthorized materials 
online, without issuance of proper court warrant. 126   These Letters, 
produced under the pressure of the U.S. government to make commitments 
for stronger IPR protections, seem to be in line with the history of changes 
in the IPR regime of Korea as demanded by the United States. 
Korea already experienced sweeping changes in its intellectual 
property regime as early as in mid-1980s under the pressure of the United 
States, which was equipped with Section 301 sanctions.  In 1986, the 
Korean government was compelled to introduce a comprehensive copyright 
regime by accession to the Universal Copyright Convention and Geneva 
Phonograms Convention.  Korea made important amendments including 
extension of copyright term for the author’s lifetime plus 50 years, and 
introduction of protection for computer software, semiconductor chips, and 
sound recordings.127  Korea was also required to amend its Patent Act by 
introduction of product patent, extension of patent term for 15 years, and 
protection of microorganisms.128  
Such a radical change in intellectual property law could have 
caused negative impacts on the Korean industries and economy, which 
were still in their developing stages during the 1980s.129  However, the 
performance of Korean economy did not seem to be adversely affected by 
the change in the IPR regime, and Korea industries succeeded in 
strengthening international competitiveness, which suggests a possibility 
that some developing countries, if not all, can not only survive with the 
strengthened IPR regime but also use it to improve its industrial 
competitiveness.  Encouraged by this success record, some believe that 
Korea can use the additional changes in the IPR regime required under the 
 
125 Press Release, Korea Internet Business Association (May 28, 2007). 
126 Letter on Limitations of Liability of Internet Service Providers, from Hyun-Chong Kim, 
Minister for Trade of the Republic of Kor, to Susan C. Schwab, USTR Ambassador (June 
30, 2007), 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file948_1
2737.pdf. 
127 Record of Understanding on Intellectual Property Rights between the Republic of Korea 
and the United States of America, U.S.-S.Kor., Aug. 28, 1986, available at 
 http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005680.asp. 
128 Id. sec. B.  The Korean Trademark Act was also required to be amended to allow U.S. 
trademark owners to freely license their trademarks. See id. sec. C. 
129 Korea did not join the OECD until 1996. See William Witherell, Address at the Second 
Korea-OECD Conference: Korea in the OECD: Realising the Promise (Dec. 13-14, 2001), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/0/2698284.pdf. 
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FTA for further technological innovation and progress which is yet to be 
seen. 
E.  Investment Protection 
The United States began negotiations on investment issues with a 
high level of ambition.  This is reflected in its earlier statement that U.S. 
investors investing in Korea should be guaranteed the same rights granted 
by U.S. laws and practices, while Korean investors should not be granted 
superior rights to those accorded to domestic investors in the United 
States.130  The U.S. objectives revealed in this statement are problematic, as 
they go against the principle of reciprocity.  As to the former part of the 
statement, it would be inappropriate for one nation to impose its own 
standards and practices, even if more advanced, on the other with different 
legal, social, and economic environments and priorities, unless the other 
country’s laws and practices present clear obstacles to foreign investment 
and its own standards and practices somehow offer a workable alternative 
solution for that other country.  Recent bilateral disputes between the two 
countries have exposed the difference in perspectives and practices 
between the two countries when it comes to the propriety of governmental 
policies and laws, which apparently boils down to cultural differences.131  
 
130 Portman, Letter, supra note 87. 
131 In recent high-profile bilateral trade disputes, the United States and Korea registered 
sharp differences concerning the role of the government, and the relationship between the 
governmental sector and the private sector.  It turned out that these differences are largely 
based on differing cultural and societal characteristics.  See, e.g., World Trade Organization, 
United States — Countervailing Duty Investigations on Dynamic Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors from Korea, WT/DS296/R (Feb. 21, 2005), at 7.6-7.8, 7.49-7.50, 7.59, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/296r_a_e.pdf (reflecting different 
views in the two countries regarding the role of the government in times of national 
economic emergency).  Indeed, one commentator opined that “law is a form of cultural 
expression and is not readily transplantable from one culture to another without going 
through some process of indigenization.  French law is as much a reflection of the French 
culture as Russian law is a reflection of Russian culture.”  MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 10 (West 1982). Yet another commentator, 
Luke Nottage, noted that such cultural difference still plays a role in the administration of 
law in Japan, pointing out that continuing tension between the new legal regime and the 
traditional legal regime in Japan should be taken into account, where the former has been 
affected by the influx of Anglo-American jurisprudence, while the latter is based on the 
notion of social values distinct from profit maximization.  See Luke Nottage, Nothing New 
in the (North) East? Interpreting the Rhetoric and Reality of Japanese Corporate 
Governance, PAC. ECON. PAPER 359, Austl.-Japan Research Center (2006), available at 
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/pep/pep-359.pdf; see also Leon Wolff, Corporate 
Governance and Law Reform in Japan: From the Lost Decade to the End of History?, in 
JAPANESE MANAGEMENT: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW BALANCE BETWEEN CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
133-166 (Rene Haak & Markus Pudelko eds., 2005).  Apparently, this trait still persists and 
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Under these circumstances, the wisdom of adopting perspectives and 
practices favored by or familiar to one party can be easily challenged.  The 
latter part of the statement seems to ignore the need for countries seeking 
foreign investment to provide incentives to induce foreign investment to an 
area where domestic investment is hard to attract.132  Those incentives are 
not unfair in nature and to regulate this would not be consistent with the 
goals of the FTA to promote trade and investment.  Nonetheless, the FTA 
stipulates that there should be no favorable treatment of foreign 
investors.133 
In the U.S.-Korea FTA, the United States and Korea have agreed to 
accord national treatment and MFN treatment to foreign investors. 134  
Negotiations continued on the dispute settlement procedure for investor-
state disputes (ISDs) as well as the adoption of temporary safeguards 
against cross-border capital transactions and remittances in national 
financial emergencies.135  In relation to the former, concern was raised that 
the dispute settlement procedure, which allows foreign investors to file 
complaints against the government of the other party outside the domestic 
court system of the latter, may undermine the state’s ability to establish and 
undertake legitimate public policies that may have a bearing on foreign 
investment. 136   The two countries agreed on the dispute settlement 
 
affects economic regulation in countries affected by this culture. These differing notions 
regarding the role of government in the context of different cultures were also discussed in 
one of the WTO disputes between the United States and Japan.  See Panel Report, Japan — 
Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Apr. 22, 1998), 
at 10.43–10.46 [hereinafter Japan Film], available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds44_e.htm.  Under these circumstances, one could argue 
that an attempt to apply laws and regulations of one country to another always requires 
careful scrutiny and forethought. 
132 By way of example, in 2002 the state of Alabama provided a US$252.8 million package 
to attract Hyundai Automobiles to establish a manufacturing plant in the state as an effort to 
stimulate its sagging economic vitality.  See Michael Tomberlin & Kristi L. Ellis, Hyundai 
Incentives: $252.8 million, State Officials Say Automaker’s $1 Billion Investment Worth It, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, April 5, 2002, at 1A & 2A.  In other words, even the local governments 
of the United States offer preferential treatment to foreign investors to have them invest in 
their own regions. 
133 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art.11.4, para. 2. 
134 Id. arts. 11.3 & 11.4. 
135 Press Release, MOFAT, Han-Mi FTA Je 4 Cha Gongsig Hyeobsang Gyeolgwa [Major 
Results of the Fourth Round of Official Korea-U.S. FTA Negotiations] (Oct. 27, 2006) 
[hereinafter MOFAT, Fourth Round Results], http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/broadpsd. 
asp?country_idx=19 (use arrows to search archive for press release no. 62, dated Oct. 27, 
2006). 
136 Joo-Hee Roh, Government Adopts the Settlement Procedure for Investor-State Disputes 
as Inevitable, PRESSIAN NEWS, Nov. 22 2006 (in Korean).  Some experts opined that foreign 
investors would not be able to undermine public policies by filing complaints under the 
proposed dispute settlement procedure.  See Press Release, MOFAT, Han-Mi FTA Je 3 Cha 
Hyeobsang Gwanlyeon Jeonglye Beuliping [Korea-U.S. FTA Negotiations Third Briefing] 
144 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW                [Vol. 6 
 
procedure with certain exemptions.137  Korea – having a vivid memory of 
the catastrophic 1997 financial crisis – demanded a temporary safeguard be 
in place which would enable the government to stop the outflow of foreign 
currency reserves should this type of financial crisis recur.138  The United 
States and Korea have agreed to this safeguard provided that there is a one-
year durational limit and that certain guidelines are met.139  Both parties 
have also agreed to prevent retrospective application of law and to allow a 
provisional remedy to aggrieved investors.140 
F. Regulatory Issues 
The United States has long held the opinion that much of the 
difficulty that U.S. exporters face abroad has been caused by lack of 
transparency in the application of relevant laws and regulations of the 
importing countries, and thus has consistently contended that these 
regulatory problems undermine the interests of U.S. businesses abroad.  
Moreover, the United States pointed to the existence of collusion between 
the Korean government and private corporations, and questioned the 
procedural transparency of trade and investment laws.141  Consequently, the 
United States raised regulatory and institutional issues during negotiations 
and applied pressure on Korea to improve the transparency and 
predictability of its legal procedures.  As a result, every chapter of the FTA 
includes a separate transparency provision requiring publications and 
notices prior to the implementation of relevant laws.  There is also a 
separate provision dedicated to the manner and timing of the publication of 
any laws or regulations that will affect the rights of the other country under 
the FTA.142  
In addressing regulatory issues, however, reciprocity seems to have 
been missing.  The USTR affirmed that U.S. laws and regulations would 
 
(Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/broadpsd.asp?country_idx=19 (use 
arrows to search archive for press release no. 55, dated Sept. 5, 2006). 
137 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art 11, sec. B. 
138 For the causes and developments of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, see generally 
Andrew Berg, The Asia Crisis: Causes, Policy Responses and Outcomes (Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/99/138, 1999),  
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp99138.pdf (noting the 
significant role of sudden capital outflows as a source of fundamental vulnerability during 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997); see also HAIDER A. KHAN, GLOBAL MARKETS AND 
FINANCIAL CRISES IN ASIA (2004) (explaining the financial crisis as the result of 
liberalization, weak domestic institutions for economic governance and a chaotic global 
market system without global governance institutions). 
139 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, annex 11-G. 
140 Id. arts. 11.15–11.22.  See also MOFAT, Fourth Round Results, supra note 135. 
141 Portman, Letter, supra note 87. 
142 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 21.1 
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not change as a result of the U.S. - Korea FTA, but that the United States 
would raise regulatory issues with Korea and seek changes accordingly.143  
It should also be noted that the significant differences in legal traditions 
and business practices may cause foreign businesses to conclude, often 
inaccurately, that they have been subjected to unfair and unjust 
treatment.144  For instance, the United States emphasizes and promotes 
individual competition.  By way of contrast, Korean culture places 
importance on the traditional cooperative relationship between the 
government and businesses,145 even though government interventions have 
been reduced in recent decades.   
This difference stems from the dissimilar perspectives on the role 
of government and the way in which government and private businesses 
should interact.146  Thus, it may be inappropriate to measure the perceived 
government-private cooperation relationship in Korea against U.S. customs 
and practices, or to discuss ways of dissolving such a relationship under the 
FTA with a presumption that it is a form of illegal collusion that results in 
unfair competition and lack of transparency.147  It will be more efficient to 
address specific instances of unfair treatment affecting trade and 
investment through mutually-agreed communication channels, such as 
consultations, rather than trying to force one country to conform its laws 
and customs to the standards of the other.  A renowned Australian scholar 
has also commented on this U.S. tendency to have a FTA negotiating 
partner comply with its own practices and expectations, by stating, with 
reference to the U.S.-Australia FTA, that “while Australia wanted 
conventional FTAs with reduction of trade barriers, the United States 
seems to have wanted its own version of an FTA to be imposed on 
Australia with new regulatory attachments such as higher IPR 
standards.”148 
 
143 Portman, Letter, supra note 87. 
144 See generally Japan Film, supra note 131, for the argument on the part of the United 
States, in noting that Japan’s new legal regime has been affected by the influx of Anglo-
American jurisprudence, and the further point that any attempt to apply laws and regulations 
of one country to another always requires careful consideration of social and cultural 
differences. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Professor Ross Buckley of the University of New South Wales referred to the Australian 
stance as the 19th century free trade agreement and the American attitude as the (American) 
21st century free trade one.  Research Seminar with Professor Ross Buckley, in The 
University of New South Wales, Sydney (Feb. 19, 2009); see also CHALLENGES TO 
MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL 
AGREEMENTS (Ross Buckley et al, eds., Kluwer Law Int’l 2008) (noting that WTO 
multilateral negotiations to liberalize trade have become increasingly difficult, as newer 
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With respect to the competition issue, specification that the 
antitrust laws be applied to the Korean conglomerates (chaebol) became a 
point of debate.149  The United States questioned whether competition laws 
are being applied strictly to those chaebol corporations and wanted the FTA 
to specify the responsibility of the Korean government to apply 
competition laws to them.  The Korean government disagreed and argued 
that since antitrust laws of Korea are already being applied to chaebol 
corporations, explicit specification in the FTA would be inappropriate.  
Here again, the demand by the United States for such specification in the 
FTA shows its consistent emphasis on the regulatory issues which is 
arguably beyond the purview of trade agreements.  Perhaps both parties 
could have considered replacing rampant applications of trade remedy 
measures, such as antidumping measures, with more comprehensive 
regulations against anticompetitive behavior, but it was not discussed in the 
course of the FTA negotiations.150  
Lastly, there are a couple of regulatory issues between the United 
States and Korea that are worth mentioning, namely the Korean taxation 
scheme on automobiles, and the drug price review system.  In relation to 
automobiles, the United States has been complaining about Korea’s 
taxation scheme, which imposes higher tax rates on automobiles with larger 
engine displacement.  Because U.S.-made automobiles tend to have 
engines larger in size than those of their competitors, they have been 
subjected to higher tax rates.  In the FTA, Korea has agreed to amend its 
Special Consumption Tax Law and the Annual Vehicle Tax Law to reduce 
the tax rates applicable to automobiles with larger engine displacement.151  
Within 3 years of the date of coming into force of this Agreement, vehicles 
with engines larger than 1000 ccs are to be taxed at a single rate of no more 
than 5%.152  Korea has also agreed not to amend or otherwise modify the 
Subway Bond and Regional Development Bond so as to increase the 
disparity in purchase rates across categories of vehicles at the time the 
Agreement comes into force.153  Higher tax rates applicable to cars with 
larger engine displacement have been justified in Korea due to its policy of 
discouraging use of automobiles that consume more gas and overload 
 
members are generally developing countries with interests and attitudes different from those 
of industrialized countries). 
149 Press Release, MOFAT, What Are Trade Remedies, Intellectual Property Rights, and 
Positive Lists? (Nov. 8, 2006). 
150 The Canada-Chile FTA abolished antidumping duties after 2003, and competition laws 
would control dumping disputes between the two countries.  
151 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art 2.12(a) & (b) (providing that vehicles with engines under 
1000 ccs will not be taxed; engines larger than 1001–2000 ccs will not be taxed more than 
5%; and engines larger than 2000 ccs will not be taxed more than 8%). 
152 Id. art. 2.12(a)(ii). 
153 Id. art. 2.12(c). 
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smaller Korean roads with heavier weights.  Hence, the demand by the 
United States for this regulatory change is another example where one 
country’s regulatory scheme for legitimate public policy objectives had to 
be abandoned to satisfy the interests of its trade partner.  
The United States also opposed Korea’s drug price review system, 
under which the appropriateness of a drug price is reviewed before it can be 
covered by the publicly-funded Korean health insurance program.  The 
United States has been concerned that U.S. drugs, which tend to be more 
expensive, may not be covered by the Korean health insurance program.  
Nonetheless, Korea has maintained that it would not abandon the price 
review system, which it considers necessary to sustain the publicly-funded 
health insurance system in sound fiscal condition, but has agreed to 
establish a committee to consider views of U.S. pharmaceutical companies. 
154  In the final draft, Korea has agreed to ensure that the procedures, rules, 
and guidelines that apply to reimbursements are fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory, and that reimbursements would be made at competitive 
market-derived prices.155  
Concern has been raised that by allowing competitive market-
derived prices to be the measure of reimbursements, the price review 
system will not be able to achieve its objective of keeping reimbursements 
at an economically feasible level and of maintaining the sound fiscal 
condition of the publicly funded Korean healthcare system.156  Furthermore, 
under the effects of a footnote in Article 5.2 of the FTA – which stipulates 
that pharmaceutical formulary development and management will be 
governed by the rules on government procurement – only technical 
examinations, but not economic review, will be allowed during selection of 
drugs.  Consequently, the government agency will not be able to exclude 
expensive foreign drugs on the basis of their prices so long as those drugs 
are approved for safety and effectiveness.157  An estimate has been made 
that because of this concession, the financial burden on the Korean 
healthcare system will increase by over US$2 billion a year to cover the 
increased reimbursement costs.158 
 
154 MOFAT, Seventh Round Results, supra note 111. 
155 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 5.2 (a) & (b). 
156 Gungangbohumeun Jikyutdaduni: Hyupjungmoon Bunsukhalsoorok Gagwan [You Said 
that You Would Regulate the Price of Medication: the More You Analyze the Agreement, the 
More Nonsensical It Is], PRESSIAN NEWS, May 27, 2007, http://www.pressian.com/article/ 
article.asp?article_num=30070527151529&Section=. 
157 Id. 
158 Interview by Si-Yeon Kim and Ho-Joong Kim with Suk-Kyun Woo, Policy Director, 
Alliance of Korean Healthcare Assn’s (Mar. 29, 2007) (in Korean).  
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G. Restrictions on Trade Remedy Measures  
Trade remedy measures, such as antidumping (AD) measures, 
countervailing duties (CVDs), and exclusionary orders against alleged 
unfair trade practices, should also be examined in relation to regulatory 
issues.  When abused, these trade measures do not promote free trade, and 
particularly in the case of AD measures, there is little question that these 
measures have operated as discriminatory and arbitrary import regulations 
against inexpensive exports. 159   Abusive trade remedy measures are 
contrary to the very objective of the FTA of promoting free trade, and an 
effective mechanism should be in order to deal with them.160  In relation to 
trade remedy measures, extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust 
laws against businesses of trading partner nations, and enforcement of 
criminal charges on their citizens for business activities taken place outside 
U.S. territory, run counter to the internationally recognized “Principle of 
Territoriality” that domestic laws apply within the boundaries of the nation 
making such laws.  This practice is also inconsistent with the aim of the 
FTA to establish a business and economic environment favorable to free 
trade.161   
 
159 Yong-Shik Lee, Toward a More Open Trading System: Should Safeguards Replace 
Antidumping Measures?, 1 21ST CENTURY L. REV. 2, 3-14 (2005).  A Yale economist, T. N. 
Srinivasan “characterized antidumping as the equivalent of a nuclear weapon in the armoury 
of trade policy and suggested removing [such practices]” altogether.  Int’l Inst. for 
Sustainable Dev., Report on the WTO’s High-Level Symposium on Trade and Development 
(Mar. 17–18, 1999) (summary record of remarks by delegates at WTO Symposium on Trade 
and Development), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/summhl_e. 
htm. 
160 In the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), for 
instance, entered into by China and Hong Kong on June 29, 2003, there is a prohibition 
against imposition of AD and CVD measures.  Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic 
Partnership Agreement, China-H.K., June 29, 2003 (entered into force Jan. 1, 2004), ch.1, 
art. 7, available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/files/main_e.pdf.  AD measures are 
also not permitted in the Australia-New Zealand FTA.  Agreement Establishing the 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, Feb. 27, 2009 (entered into force Jan. 1, 
2010), ch. 1, art. 3, sec. e(ii), available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/aanzfta.PDF.  
161 Extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law has been internationally criticized, and 
countries including Great Britain and Canada have enacted laws that prohibit their citizens 
from cooperating with extraterritorial U.S. antitrust investigations.  See, e.g., Protection of 
Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/1980/11/contents; see also A. V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The 
British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (1981).  However, 
though the Canadian approach has historically been to oppose extraterritoriality of U.S. 
antitrust laws after the uranium controversies of the 1970s and 80s the prosecutorial 
agencies of the two governments signed a series of high-level memorandums, ultimately 
leading up to the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) of 1990.  Konrad von 
Finckenstein, Can. Comm’r of Competition, Address at a Joint Meeting in Vancouver of the 
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law and the Canadian Bar Association 
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Korea, whose exports have been frequently targeted for AD and 
CVD measures from various countries including the United States,162 
requested Washington to tighten its requirements for the application of 
these measures in order to prevent abuse.  However, the USTR has 
expressed difficulty in doing so,163 reiterating that the U.S. law does not 
give them the authority to make decisions that will change the existing 
trade remedy laws, and the decision is one to be made by the U.S. 
Congress.164  Instead, both governments have agreed to set up a Committee 
on Trade Remedies where they would discuss trade remedy measures, 165 
but no real change in the application of trade remedy measures is expected 
as a result of the negotiations since it requires legislative adjustments on 
the part of the United States which it has consistently refused. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS OF THE U.S. -KOREA FTA 
A. Subsequent Legislation in Korea after Conclusion of the US -
Korea FTA 
Even before the ratification of the US-Korea FTA by the Korean 
National Assembly, a series of legislations and bills have been introduced 
by the Korean government in order to ensure conformity with the 
agreement:  it was expected that as many as 25 statutes, including tax and 
customs laws, foreign trade laws, intellectual property laws and the laws 
regulating service industries, would have to be either newly enacted or 
amended to ensure conformity with the FTA.166  The following discusses 
examples of two areas of law, namely the law regarding legal service 
market and intellectual property law. 
In response to the upcoming opening of the Korean legal service 
market in accordance with the provisions of the FTA,167 the Foreign Legal 
 
National Competition Law Section: International Antitrust Cooperation: Bilateralism or 
Multilateralism? (May 31, 2001), available at http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/Canada/ 
Policy/1a.htm.  
162 See KTC, STATISTICS, supra note 84. 
163 MOFAT, First Round, supra note 103. 
164  Suk-Hwan Choi, FTA Hyupsangdan, Muyeogguje Yogu Sahang Daepog Chugso 
[Delegation for FTA Negotiations, Significantly Reduces Demands for Trade Remedies], 
PRESSIAN NEWS, Dec. 6, 2006 http://www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num 
=30061206131812&Section=. 
165 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, sec. C. 
166 Beobjecheo ‘Han-Mi FTA Jeongbipilyo Beoblyeong 70geon’ [Ministry of Legislation: 
‘70 Laws Require Amendment under the KORUS FTA’], CHOSUN ILBO (June 7, 2007), 
http://issue.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/06/11/2007061100910.html.  In addition, it 
is expected that 25 Presidential Decrees and 18 Ministerial Ordinances will be amended to 
conform with the FTA. Id. 
167 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, ch. 12. 
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Consultant Act (“FLCA”) was enacted on March 2, 2009 and took effect as 
of September 26, 2009.  The FLCA permits a foreign lawyer who is 
licensed in FTA signatory countries to register with the Korean Bar 
Association as a "foreign legal consultant (‘FLC’)" for limited law practice 
in Korea and a foreign law firm to open an office in Korea.  
The liberalization of the Korean legal service market under the 
FLCA takes three steps.  At the first stage, the FLC is permitted to offer 
consultation of law of the country where the FLC is licensed; consultation 
of treaties to which the country joined or of generally recognized 
international law; and representation in international arbitration to which 
the applicable law is foreign law or public international law.  At the second 
stage, which is set to start within two years after the FTA comes into force, 
a foreign law firm will be allowed to form an affiliate relationship with a 
Korean law firm and is permitted to take cases with a Korean law firm in 
which both the U.S. and Korean laws are involved.  At the final phase, 
which is scheduled to start within five years after the FTA becomes 
effective, a foreign law firm will be permitted to form a partnership with a 
Korean law firm and hire Korean lawyers under certain conditions. 
As to the intellectual property law area, amendments to the 
Copyright Act were made to reflect the terms of the U.S.-Korea FTA.168  
The following changes were made: (1) neighboring rights are fully 
protected in accordance with the international treaties; (2) certain online 
service providers (“OSPs”) shall take necessary measures that cut off 
illegal forwarding of the relevant works if requested by the holder of rights; 
(3) the Korean government, including local governments, may adopt 
administrative measures to prevent copyright infringement, such as 
collection, deletion, or destruction of copies and tools which infringe 
copyright, and suspension of infringing bulletin board service after three 
warnings (so called “Three Strike-out System”); (4) copyright infringers 
may be indicted in the absence of the complaint filed by the copyright 
owner, if such infringements were committed commercially and habitually.  
Also, by amendment to the Customs Act, the border measures extends to 
copyright infringement where a copyright owner can record its works with 
the customs office and take actions if suspected infringing goods pass 
through customs. 
In addition, the Korean government proposed other IPR-related 
bills to the National Assembly, to comply with the FTA provisions.169  The 
 
168 Jeojakgwon beob [Copyright Act], Act. No. 432 (1957), amended and substantially 
revised by Law No. 3916, Dec. 31, 1986, and Law No. 8101, Dec. 28, 2006 (entered into 
force June 29, 2007), amended by Law No. 9529, Mar. 25, 2009 (entered into force Sept. 26, 
2009), amended by Law No. 9625, Apr. 22, 2009 (entered into force July 23, 2009) (S. 
Kor.), available at http://eng.copyright.or.kr/law_01_01.html.  
169 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 52 (S. Kor.), available at 
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/home/att_file/download/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Korea.
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bills included further amendments to the Copyright Act,170 the Patent Act171 
and the Trademark Act.172  These developments and efforts on the part of 
the Korean government demonstrated the strong will of the Korean 
government to implement the U.S.-Korea FTA immediately after its 
ratification by the legislature.  The Korean government also prepared 
revisions of administrative regulations for implementation of the FTA.  
There has been no corresponding effort on the part of the U.S. Congress to 
enact or amend any of the U.S. legislations. 
B. Additional Negotiation of the FTA between the United States 
and Korea  
Beginning from early 2010, the United States and Korea sought to 
find a breakthrough for the pending U.S.-Korea FTA.  The breakthrough 
came in June 2010 at the G-20 meeting in Toronto, when the presidents of 
the two countries agreed to make concerted efforts to finalize the 
agreement by the following G-20 meeting in Seoul in November 2010.173  
Accordingly, President Obama directed USTR Ron Kirk to work with his 
Korean counterpart to resolve outstanding issues, namely the automobile 
and beef issues.174  President Obama also indicated his willingness to 
present the FTA for Senate ratification once the “additional negotiation” 
was complete on November 11, 2010.  
Despite the efforts of the two governments since the 
announcement, including successive rounds of intensive negotiations right 
before the deadline, the two sides failed to reach agreement. 175  In the joint 
press conference in Seoul, the two presidents expressed their frustration but 
promised to direct the officials of the two governments to continue the 
negotiations to resolve the outstanding issues.176  This promise bore fruit 
 
pdf (empowering both the Executive branch and the National Assembly to submit bills of 
legislation). 
170 Submitted on October 10, 2008, as Bill No.1801513, and currently pending before the 
National Assembly. 
171 Proposed on October 25, 2007, as Bill No. 177655, but not reviewed due to expiry of the 
2008 parliamentary session.  
172 Submitted on October 13, 2008, as Bill No. 1801518. 
173 Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Remarks by President Obama and 
President Lee Myung-Bak of the Republic of Korea After Bilateral Meeting (June 26, 
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-
and-president-lee-myung-bak-republic-korea-after-bilateral-. 
174 See COOPER, PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 1. 
175 Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Press Conference by the President After 
G20 Meetings in Seoul, Korea (Nov. 12, 2010),  
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/12/press-conference-
president-after-g20-meetings-seoul-korea.  
176 Id. 
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when the representatives of the two countries finally completed additional 
negotiation on December 3, 2010, with new agreements after four-days of 
intensive talks.177  Those agreements include further concessions by Korea 
on the automobile issue,178 which will help overcome the opposition to the 
FTA by the U.S. automobile industry but have been criticized in Korea as 
undermining Korea’s key trade interest to be gained by the FTA.179 
C. Prospects for Ratification by the U.S. and Korean Legislatures 
As cited above, there have been considerable political objections to 
the U.S.-Korea FTA in both countries.  Ultimately, however, the U.S.-
Korea FTA is expected to be ratified by both legislatures.180  Despite the 
perceived imbalance of gains from the FTA and the social and economic 
risks it creates, the Korean political leadership seems to be determined to 
have the FTA with the United States, because of their conviction that this 
 
177 Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Statement by the President Announcing 
the US-Korea Trade Agreement (Dec. 3, 2010),  
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/03/statement-president-
announcing-us-korea-trade-agreement. 
178 Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Informational Press Release: Increasing 
U.S. Auto Exports and Growing U.S. Jobs Through the U.S. Korea Agreement (Dec. 3, 
2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/fact_sheet_increasing_us_auto_exports_us_ko
rea_free_trade_agreement.pdf. 
179 Dae-Hee Lee, Migukcha Sooip Jangbyuk Munuhjyudta: ‘Obamaeyu Sunglee’ [Import 
Barrier for American Cars has Collapsed: ‘Obama’s Victory’], PRESSIAN NEWS, Dec. 5, 
2010, http://www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=30101205132112&section 
=02.  According to the new agreement, the removal of U.S. tariffs against import of 
automobiles from Korea, which has been hailed by the Korean government as a major 
achievement, will be suspended for five years for passenger cars and for ten years for trucks.  
This will be a loss to Korea which exports significantly more automobiles to the U.S. than 
the U.S. does to Korea.  Korea has also agreed to relax application of new environmental 
and gas mileage requirements in favor of U.S. automobile exports.  At the request of the 
U.S., Korea has further agreed to a safeguard provision whereby a party of the FTA may 
adopt tariffs against imported automobiles if imports surge after the removal of tariffs.  In 
return for these concessions, Korea reportedly received concessions on agriculture and 
pharmaceutical imports, but one criticism was that the extent of U.S. concessions was not 
comparable to that of Korea on the automobile issue.  Reflecting on this imbalance, a senior 
Korean politician commented that additional negotiation was bound to be completed in the 
U.S.’s favor, since it was held shortly after the Yeon-Pyeong incident, when North Korea 
shelled the South Korean island causing civilian casualties, and South Korea asked for U.S. 
diplomatic and military assistance to preserve its security against the North. Kim Jong-
Hoon: ‘‘Hyupsang Jalmothaetda’ go mulruhnamyun haebyeongdae jiwon" [Kim Jong-
Hoon: ‘If I Am Fired Because ‘the Negotiations Fail,’ I Will Join the Marines’], CHOSUN 
ILBO, Dec. 5, 2010, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/12/05/2010120500573. 
html?Dep1=news&Dep2=top&Dep3=top. 
180 LEE, BETTER ALTERNATIVE, supra note 9, at 1. 
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FTA will “upgrade” the Korean economy by providing it with a new 
momentum for further economic growth; and that the FTA will also help 
strengthen the security alliance with the United States.181  
A renowned economist, Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, has 
commented that Korea will (eventually) sign anything that the United 
States asks, due to its security concerns.182  This is likely to be true, at least 
for the FTA, in the end. With the U.S army playing an important role in 
maintaining Korea’s national security, a certain extent of imbalance may 
not be sufficient to justify backing away from the most important trade deal 
with the United States.  For the United States, some of the objections to the 
FTA have already lost ground since Korea began to import American beef, 
albeit, with some restrictions, and the political leadership will eventually 
see how the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations have met most of its key trade 
interests with Korea.  With China rapidly growing as an economic rival, 
both U.S. Congress and the Democratic administration will also see the 
vital importance of this “economic alliance” with Korea through the FTA. 
VI.  FUTURE IMPACTS OF THE U.S. -KOREA FTA 
A. Economic Integration between the United States and Korea 
The U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations have achieved an extraordinary 
result with respect to removing traditional trade barrier tariffs – there will 
be no tariffs for trade of all industrial goods183 and complete market access 
will be granted to all agricultural products except rice.  The United States 
has also attained a triumphant result, the magnitude of which is yet to be 
realized by some of the political leaders: the FTA met almost all of U.S. 
key trade objectives vis-à-vis Korea, such as market access for its 
agricultural products and services industries, as well as securing 
fundamental regulatory changes in Korea that will pave the way for 
increasing exports of key U.S. products — such as pharmaceuticals — and 
enhancing protection of its IPR interests to a level the USTR describes 
“state of the art.”  
 
181 The resolve of the Korean leadership to ratify the FTA was perhaps well demonstrated 
when Representative Park Jin, Chairman of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs, Trade 
and Unification Sub-Committee, having faced strong opposition from the opposing party, 
excluded opposing Committee members from the meeting room and tabled the ratification 
of the U.S.-Korea FTA without going through the normal process.  Hyun-Kyung Kang, 
Assembly in FTA Conflict, supra note 4. 
182 Jagdish Bhagwati, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law 
(ASIL) Conference at the University of Minnesota Law School: Developing Countries in the 
GATT Legal System, (May 24, 2007). 
183 Press Release, MOFAT, Final Negotiation Results, supra note 82. 
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From the outset of the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations, the USTR 
indicated that its objectives were not limited to the removal of trade 
barriers, but included seeking changes in Korea’s regulatory systems and 
practices as necessary to create an optimal business environment for U.S. 
export industries. 184   The U.S. stance is in line with the previous 
comprehensive FTAs that it has pursued with other countries.  This intent 
has also been revealed in the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations by the U.S.’s 
demands, inter alia, for legal changes in Korea’s IPR protection, creation 
of a investment dispute settlement process that will sometimes replace 
domestic court proceedings, changes in Korea’s domestic tax scheme on 
automobiles, adjustment of the drug price review system, and specific ways 
in which notice of pending legislation is to be given and specific laws are 
to be applied.185  Many of the U.S. demands go well beyond trade issues 
and have the effect of setting parameters for a broader range of Korean 
domestic policies.  This raises the question of whether the proposed U.S.-
Korea FTA is an attempt to integrate the economies of the United States 
and of Korea, in the sense that the systems and practices of the latter will 
be aligned in accordance with those of the former, even if systems of 
economic governance are maintained separate between the two countries. 
This “economic integration” seems to have support not only from 
U.S. business communities, but also from some of the Korean population, 
including high-level officials who believe that the “advanced” U.S. 
standards are the global standards, and should therefore be adopted for the 
benefit of Korea. They contend that the adoption of these standards through 
the FTA will improve the competitiveness and efficiency of the Korean 
economy.186  Nonetheless, identifying the systems and practices of a nation 
that has different economic, social, and cultural priorities as simply being 
more advanced, and attempting to adopt them without due reference to 
those differences, would lead to problems.  For instance, the more 
“advanced” U.S. economic systems and practices have been criticized for 
placing too much emphasis on competition and short-term profits, as 
dramatically shown in the recent debacles of the financial crisis in 2008, 
and too little on other important values, such as provision of the public 
good and protection of the economically underprivileged.  The neglect of 
these values has caused extreme wealth gaps among its population and led 
 
184 Portman, Letter, supra note 87. 
185 It has been estimated that as much as 15% of Korean laws will have to be amended after 
the U.S.-Korea FTA, while the United States is prepared to amend none.  See Joo-Hee Roh, 
Han-Mi FTA Chaegyul Dwaemyun Bubryul 15% Ttuduh Gochuhya, [After the U.S.-Korea 
FTA, 15% of Laws Will Have to be Amended], PRESSIAN NEWS, Jan. 16, 2007, 
 http://www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=30070116164222&Section=. 
186 Hyun-Chong Kim, Significance of the Korea-U.S. FTA from Korea’s Perspective, supra 
note 20. 
2011]  THE UNITED STATES – KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT        155            
 
to the inadequacy of its social welfare system.187  An economic culture 
emphasizing consumption is an important cause of the astronomical budget 
and trade deficits in the United States.188  It has been suggested that 
implanting U.S. economic systems and practices in Korea may pose the 
danger of dismantling Korean public policy and social stability.189 
A careful analysis should be conducted to see whether the expected 
gains from the proposed FTA are balanced between the United States and 
Korea.  While the United States is expected to increase its exports 
significantly in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and services,190 the increase in 
Korean exports may not be comparable because U.S. tariff rates are already 
low on major Korean exports, including automobiles, semiconductors, and 
ships.  Furthermore, major Korean export industries, such as automobiles, 
have already been increasing production within the United States.191  Also, 
Korea has been unsuccessful in getting the United States to agree to tighten 
its requirements for the application of AD and CVD measures against 
Korean products, which would have provided tangible benefits to the 
Korean exports.192  Korea has also been unable to persuade the United 
States to agree to change its rules of origin for textile products based on 
yarn-forwarding,193 save a few exceptions.  Additionally, Korea has not 
been able to increase the number of job-based visa issuances for Korean 
 
187 For example, the United States does not have universal healthcare coverage and due to 
the high premiums of private insurance companies, more than 50 million Americans are 
without any health insurance coverage.  See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2009 22 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf.  These 
people are unlikely to have other financial sources for adequate medical care — though the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010 is expected to reduce the 
number of uninsured.  In contrast, Korea has enjoyed a publicly-funded, universal health 
care system since the 1970s, under which virtually every citizen is entitled to health care, 
indicative of a clearly differing social consensus in each country as to the public provision 
of health care to the economically disadvantaged. 
188 The U.S. budget deficit reached US$455 billion and trade deficit US$673 billion in 2008.  
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, The Federal Government’s Financial Health: A Citizen’s 
Guide to the 2008 Financial Report of the United States Government (Feb. 13, 2009), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/financial/citizensguide2008.pdf (referring to U.S. budget 
deficit in 2008); see also Mild Increase in U.S. Trade Deficit a Good Thing, FINANCIAL 
POST, May 12, 2009, http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=1588142 (referring to U.S. 
trade deficit in 2008). 
189 Yong-Shik Lee, Issues and Outlook, supra note 29, at 226. 
190 USITC, Impact, supra note 15, at 5-19–5-21. 
191 Hae-Yeong Lee, Worst International Fraud, see supra note 83.   
192 KTC, STATISTICS, supra note 84. 
193 The 2001 USITC report indicates that the textiles industry is among the product areas in 
which Korea may expect the largest increases in exports under the FTA.  USITC, Impact, 
supra note 15, at 5-11 (indicating that the textile industry is among the product areas in 
which Korea may expect the largest increase in exports under the U.S.-Korea FTA). 
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service providers, which could have secured a constant flow of Korean 
exports on the service front.194  Dubious outcomes in these areas of core 
interest to Korea, coupled with the granting of major concessions in 
agriculture and services to the U.S., are expected to cause large job losses 
and may also sacrifice Korea’s growth potential in these areas. This 
possibility has brewed widespread skepticism as to the nature of the 
prospective benefit for Korea, though some studies taking a broader view 
of the FTA suggest it will have mixed costs and benefits for both sides.195  
The social and economic impact of the elaborate IPR provisions and the 
provisions affecting the operation of the drug price review system will also 
be significant.196 
In addition to the substantive problems posed by the proposed 
U.S.-Korea FTA, procedural issues have been raised with respect to the 
negotiation process.  It has been pointed out that the U.S.-Korea FTA 
negotiations could have started with more preparation, particularly on the 
part of Korea,197 and that the Korean government could have exerted efforts 
to consult interest groups which might be affected by the proposed FTA.  
Furthermore, the parties proceeded in haste in an attempt to complete all 
negotiations before the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) of the U.S. 
President expired in the summer of 2007. 198   Consequently, fierce 
 
194 According to the 2001 USITC report, Korea’s service exports are expected to decrease by 
over 5% under the U.S.-Korea FTA. Id. at 5-12. 
195 But see Schott, Negotiating, supra note 89 (explaining how the U.S.-Korea FTA would 
result in some shifts in employment in Korea, but also arguing that Korea as a whole would 
benefit from the FTA and that there would be a change in the allocation rather than degree 
of employment). 
196 See supra notes 154 to 158 and accompanying text.  A proponent of the U.S.-Korea FTA 
described the FTA as “the economic highway” for Korea.  Cho Tae-Yul, Deputy Minister 
for Trade, Statement at the 2007 World Knowledge Forum in Seoul: Regional Integration 
and the Next Step of KORUS FTA (Oct. 17, 2007), http://young.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/ 
common/download.jsp?boardid=753&tablename=TYPE_SPEECH&seqno=fcbfe3fd8fe0fe3
fa106b01e&fileseq=fcffbf06ef9402fff0fb106b.  This “highway” seems to be only one-way, 
since the United States made relatively few concessions in comparison to the large ones 
made by Korea in areas of key American interest, such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals, 
IPRs, and services. 
197 USITC conducted research on the economic effects of the U.S.-Korea FTA at the request 
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, and produced a CRP report in 2001 (see USITC, 
Impact, supra note 15), but according to a former adviser to the Korean President the 
Korean government did not engage in extensive research prior to the beginning of the FTA 
negotiations. By way of contrast, it completed five years of research prior to the beginning 
of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations, even though its effects were expected to be more 
limited than that of the U.S.-Korea FTA.  Joo-Myung Lee, Former Adviser to the President, 
Tae In Chung, Criticizes the U.S.-Korea FTA, PRESSIAN NEWS, Mar. 28, 2006. 
198 See Lee, Challenges, supra note 59, for a discussion of the widespread dissatisfaction 
over the Korean government’s handling of the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations; see also Korea 
Sees Worst Labor Protests in Years, CHOSUN ILBO, supra note 30. 
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objections to the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations have sharply divided 
Korean society, causing hundreds of thousands of citizens to rally in the 
streets of Korea.199  The problem has been compounded by an assertion that 
an estimate of the positive effect of the proposed U.S.-Korea FTA on the 
Korean economy, conducted by KIEP, a government-funded research 
institute, and cited extensively by the government to support the U.S.-
Korea FTA, may have been exaggerated. 200   Furthermore, democratic 
deficiency was clearly a problem during the FTA negotiations on the part 
of Korea.  Although any treaty negotiation inevitably involves a certain 
level of confidentiality and requires the executive branch to make prompt 
decisions on its own, proper consultation with various interest groups and 
the timely provision of sufficient information to domestic constituents 
could have elicited more support from the public.201   
The benefits that the FTA would create for the economy as a whole 
might not be very significant for either the United States or Korea.  USITC 
estimated that the impact of the U.S.-Korea FTA on economic growth 
would be very small: GDP increases of 0.2% for United States and 0.7% 
for Korea.202  As discussed above, several industries in the United States — 
 
199 Korea Sees Worst Labor Protests in Years, CHOSUN ILBO, supra note 30.  The Korean 
government, government-funded institutes, and big businesses in general are known to 
support the U.S.-Korea FTA, whereas progressive NGOs, labor unions, farmers, and a near 
majority of the general public oppose it.  The preference of groups like the former in favor 
of the FTA is reflected in a poll commissioned by the Korea Economic Institute (KEI) in 
Washington D.C., in which 50 corporate representatives, experts, and government officials 
expressed a rate of 90% in support of the proposed U.S.-Korea FTA.  William Watts, The 
Korea-US Free Trade Agreement: KORUS FTA Views of Experts and Concerned Parties: 
Opinion Survey Report #1 (May 15, 2006) (survey report prepared for KEI President 
Charles Pritchard), available at http://www.keia.org/Publications/Other/FTASurvey1.pdf. 
200 Joo-Hee Roh, KIEP, Han-Mi FTA Gyeongjae Hyogwa Jaegumjeung ‘Mothagaetda’ 
[KIEP Refuses to Verify Economic Effect of the U.S.-Korea FTA], PRESSIAN NEWS, Apr. 20, 
2006, www.pressian.com/scripts/section/article.asp?article_num=30060420114228.  
201 On September 7, 2006, twenty-three members of the Korean National Assembly (Korean 
legislature) filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court of Korea that the Korean 
administration usurped the powers of the Korean National Assembly in its FTA 
negotiations.  Lawmakers Launch Lawsuit Against South Korea FTA Talks (Yonhap News 
Agency, Seoul, S. Kor.), Sept. 7, 2006, available at http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php? 
article5789. Eventually, however, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the 
administration and dismissed the complaint.  Park Si-Soo, Constitutional Court Nods 
Disputed Korea-US Bill, KOR. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2010, available at http://www.bilaterals.org/ 
spip.php?article18781.  One of the authors of this article pointed out that the Korean 
administration should be required to report the progress of the FTA negotiation to the 
Korean National Assembly, so that the Korean legislature could oversee its progress on 
behalf of the people. Yong-Shik Lee, Issues and Outlook, supra note 29, at 228.  The U.S. 
has accomplished more in this regard by setting up a Congressional Oversight Group that 
receives reports and oversees trade negotiations, and by consulting and working closely with 
interest groups.  
202 USITC, Impact, supra note 15, at 5-2. 
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including agriculture, service industries, and pharmaceuticals — stand to 
gain significantly by substantially increasing their exports to Korea.203  It is, 
however, doubtful that Korea will attain reciprocal trade gains after the 
FTA when it has failed to secure its key trade interests, such as abolition or 
reduction of trade remedy measures, and when trade barriers, if any, to its 
major exports to the United States have already been low.  While Korea has 
made commitments to make substantial regulatory changes to create a more 
favorable business environment for U.S. businesses, the systems and 
practices of the United States, such as admission of foreign labor, will not 
likely be changed as a result of the FTA.  It remains to be seen what the 
final tally for Korea will be like in terms of trade benefits after agreeing to 
regulatory changes that may put considerable strains on its economic and 
social system. 
B. Stimulus for More FTAs and East Asia Free Trade Area 
Setting aside the question of the economic benefits, the conclusion 
of the U.S.-Korea FTA will be marked as a successful achievement for the 
recent bilateral arrangements that both countries have pursued.  Not only 
will it further encourage these two countries to continue forging ahead with 
their bilateral efforts with the other countries, but other countries will also 
respond more favorably to U.S. and Korea’s bilateral FTA initiatives due to 
the economic importance of these two countries.  As mentioned earlier, 
Korea is now negotiating FTAs with other major trading countries: after the 
completion of the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations, Korea has concluded 
FTAs with the European Union and India and good progress is being made 
with respect to FTA negotiations with Canada, Australia, Peru, Colombia 
and New Zealand.  It may also begin FTA negotiations with China in the 
near future.204  The United States is also conducting negotiations with 
several countries, although U.S. counterparts are smaller, and FTAs with 
them seem to have more political, rather than economic, significance.205  At 
any rate, the spreading of bilateral arrangements for FTAs may distract 
major trading countries from the multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO, 
and make the successful conclusion of the stalled Doha Round negotiations 
more difficult.  This may lead to a more fragmented trading system in the 
long run in the form of a “spaghetti bowl.”    
 
203 Id. at 5-10 (predicting that U.S. agricultural and manufacturing exports to Korea would 
significantly increase, but predicting fewer gains for the U.S. services industry). 
204 See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text (discussing China and Korea’s economic 
relationship and the potential for a Sino-Korean FTA).  
205 Id. 
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The U.S.-Korea FTA will have regional implications beyond the 
United States and Korea,206 and may set a new direction for the first trans-
Pacific free trade framework between East Asia and North America.  
Shortly after the completion of the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations, both 
China and Japan expressed a desire to sign an FTA with Korea, fearing for 
their isolation in the region.  
As mentioned earlier, feasibility studies on an FTA between Korea 
and China have been completed, and FTA negotiations between Korea and 
Japan have also begun, but have subsequently been suspended due to 
disagreement over agricultural issues.207  Japanese businesses have urged 
the Japanese government to resume the suspended FTA negotiations with 
Korea and start negotiations with the United States.208  With its growing 
influence, China is seeking a leading role in trade and economy in Asia, 
and has been looking to form closer trade relations with other major 
economies in Asia, including Korea, India, and Japan. 
C. Path to Trans-Pacific Free Trade Area 
The successful conclusion of the U.S.-Korea FTA will not only 
create the third largest free trade area in the world, after the E.U. and 
NAFTA, but may also mark the beginning of a new trans-Pacific free trade 
area, which will be the largest free trade area yet to be formed.  
The key to forming a larger free trade area that includes East Asia 
and North America would likely be determined by the Japanese stance on 
agriculture.  If Japan decides to open its agricultural market to the extent 
that Korea did in the U.S.-Korea FTA, both the United States and Korea 
will be willing to negotiate an FTA with Japan.209  The governments of 
both countries have opined that Japan’s protective stance on agriculture is 
the major obstacle to FTA negotiations with it,210 and there appears to be no 
 
206 See Schott, Negotiating, supra note 89, at 13–14 (anticipating new and revived trade 
negotiations between Korea and its regional neighbors as a result of the U.S.-Korea FTA); 
see also Inbom Choi & Jeffrey J. Schott, Free Trade Between Korea and the United States? 
63–67 (Inst. for Int’l Econ., Policy Analysis of International Economics Ser. No. 62, 2001) 
(examining the potential trade diversion effects that could be the result of passage of the 
Korea-U.S. FTA). 
207 Lee, Issues and Outlook, supra note 29, at 10. 
208  Joint Statement, KYODO NEWS, Apr. 13, 2007; Business Roundtable & Nippon 
Keidanren, Joint Statement: U.S-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (Jan. 19, 2007) 
(stating the imperative for “a comprehensive and high-level” economic partnership 
agreement between the U.S. and Japan),  
available at http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2007/007.html.  
209 It is known that Korea demands over 90% market liberalization in agriculture, but Japan 
wants to keep it down to 50%. 
210  CHANLETT-AVERY, ISSUES, supra note 18, at 14; see also supra note 47 and 
accompanying text. 
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other significant issues that will block an FTA.  Thus, if Japan’s position on 
agricultural issues changes, FTAs between Japan and these two countries 
will become feasible.  Separate bilateral FTAs among the three countries 
can lead to a legal framework for a single free trade agreement among 
them,211 similar to how the bilateral FTA between the United States and 
Canada was later adapted to include Mexico to form NAFTA.  Canada will 
also be a likely candidate of a membership for this new free trade area 
between East Asia and North America.  Canada already has an FTA with 
the United States and is currently conducting FTA negotiations with Korea.  
Business communities in both Canada and Japan have favored an FTA 
between the two countries as well.212 
China, however, will be unlikely to participate in this free trade 
area, at least in the near future, due to its political and economic differences 
with the United States and Japan.  Thus, for the United States, the 
formation of this trans-Pacific free trade area will be an ideal trade and 
economic platform on which it can keep China in check and continue to be 
a leading trade and economic force in both North America and East Asia.  
For Japan, the participation in this free trade area will strengthen its trade, 
economic, and even political position in the region against rapidly growing 
China.  For Korea and Canada, this free trade area will help them to access 
their traditional export markets in Japan and the United States, without 
creating obstacles to the furtherance of their trade relations with China.  It 
is in fact very likely that Korea will have a bilateral FTA with China and at 
the same time participate in this free trade area, as demonstrated by China’s 
willingness to sign an FTA with Korea even after Korea’s conclusion of 
FTA negotiations with the United States.213  Conclusion of FTAs with 
major trading nations such as China, the United States, Japan, and 
European Union could turn Korea into a “hub” of regional and bilateral 
free trade relations. 
If the trans-Pacific free trade area is feasible, then the next question 
is the nature and characteristics of a legal framework for this free trade area.  
The legal framework is expected to be framed largely in accordance with 
the preferences of the United States as shown in the U.S.-Korea FTA as 
well as in the other FTAs that the United States has promoted:  i.e. strong 
 
211 Three separate FTAs can be developed into a legal framework for a larger trade area 
because the contents and nature of these bilateral FTAs will not vary greatly, as they are all 
framed by the United States.   
212 Consideration of Canada-Japan Trade Pact Considered a Precursor to Japan-U.S. Deal, 
17 INT’L TRADE REPORTER 21, 834 (May 2000) (discussing the value of negotiating an FTA 
between Japan and Canada as a precursor to later attaining a U.S.-Japan FTA, “which would 
be the ultimate goal”), in Posting of Oliver Hoedeman, paxaran@antenna.nl, to 
cwj@corpwatch.org (Jun. 5, 2001),  
available at http://www.jca.apc.org/web-news/corpwatch-jp/30.html. 
213 Yoo, China, supra note 22; Lee, China and Japan, supra note 22. 
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IPR provisions, emphasis of legal transparency and public participation, 
high-degree of market opening for both agriculture and services, imposition 
of labor and environmental standards, separate dispute settlement processes 
and committees to discuss relevant issues under the FTA.  This is because 
the United States will be the key player in forming this regional free trade 
area and will be unlikely to depart from or substantially concede its strong 
policy stance that it has shown in the bilateral and other regional contexts.  
One way or another, Korea had to accommodate the U.S. priorities for most 
parts of the FTA negotiations, and it is not expected to be any different for 
Japan or Canada.   
As discussed earlier, some of the provisions in the U.S.-driven 
FTAs were intended to bring regulatory practices and the business 
environment of the signatory country in conformity with those of the 
United States in order to create an optimal business environment for U.S. 
export industries.  Thus, these provisions will have far-reaching economic, 
political, and social impact, and the degree of required market opening and 
regulatory intervention under the FTA can be characterized as one that 
leads to an economic integration among the signatory countries.  The 
question is how much of this impact can be tolerated by the society that 
may have rather different economic, political, and social priorities as 
previously discussed.  Concern has been raised that the adjustment cost for 
Korea as a result of the U.S.-Korea FTA will be enormous, particularly in 
the areas of agriculture, IPRs and health care.214  Thus, the post-FTA 
occurrences in Korea will be a barometer of whether an even larger free 
trade area between East Asia and North America will be successful and 
beneficial to all of the participating countries. 
D. Encouragement for East Asia - Europe Free Trade Area 
Economic integration between East Asia and North America 
through the formation of a free trade area may also encourage formation of 
another free trade area between East Asia and Europe.  As stated, Korea 
has completed its FTA negotiations with the European Union and the 
agreement is set to go into effect as of July 1, 2011.  Just as the U.S.-Korea 
FTA can be developed into a larger free trade area as shown above, other 
countries in the region may be added to the free trade framework initially 
formed between the European Union and Korea as well.  Japan can also be 
a participant in this agreement, again if it somehow decides to open its 
 
214 See supra notes 90–101 (agriculture), 116–129 (IPRs), 154–158 (health care and drug 
price review system), and 190–196 (predictions about future developments) and 
accompanying text. 
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agricultural market.  Japan’s bilateral FTA with the E.U.215 and Korea’s 
bilateral FTA with the E.U. can be then merged into a single framework for 
free trade, creating a free trade area between Europe and East Asia.  This 
means that East Asia can become a hub of free trade areas linked with both 
Europe and North America.  It will no doubt create significant impact and 
new dynamics in world trade and economy, but the economic analysis to 
measure this impact must yet await the realization of these pan-continental 
free trade areas.  In all of this, China is likely to be excluded.  For Korea, it 
also remains to be seen whether this “web” of FTAs would revitalize the 
Korean economy with a new growth momentum as hoped by its 
leadership.216  It indeed remains to be seen whether the FTA is a path to 
common economic prosperity or simply a false promise. 
 
 
215  Japanese business communities proposed forming an E.U.-Japan FTA. Nippon 
Keidanren, Call for the Start of Negotiations on Japan-EU Economic Integration 
Agreement: Third Proposal for Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (Nippon 
Keidanren, Tokyo, Japan), Nov. 17, 2009, available at http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/ 
policy/2009/099proposal.pdf. 
216 A Cambridge economist, Ha-Joon Chang, opined that the real reason for the sluggish 
growth of the Korean economy is that companies have substantially reduced investments 
after the 1997 financial crisis to meet shareholders’ demands for higher income dividends.  
Yeong-Jin Kim, Hanguk Gyeongjae, Yeongwonhee Puhreehmieoh Leegue Mot Olla Gal 
Soodo [An Interview with Ha-Joon Chang], CHOSUN ILBO, June 12, 2007, available at 
http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/06/12/2007061200993.html. 
